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 Electronic Records and Signatures under the
 Federal E-SIGN Legislation and the UETA
 By Robert A. Wittie and Jane K Winn*
 Federal legislation establishing legal parity between electronic records
 and signatures and their paper and ink counterparts was signed into law
 June 30, 2000, and became effective, at least for most purposes, on October
 1 . The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-
 SIGN or the Act)1 effectively sweeps away a myriad of anachronistic and
 inconsistent state and federal requirements for paper and ink documents
 and signatures. In so doing, E-SIGN eliminates many of the legal uncer-
 tainties that have surrounded the use of electronic media in commerce and
 should enable businesses and consumers alike to more fully realize the cost
 savings possible through all-electronic transactions.
 If E-SIGN eliminates old uncertainties, however, it also creates new
 ones. These arise principally with respect to interpreting and applying:
 (i) E-SIGN's unusual preemption provisions, which allow qualifying state
 laws to "modify, limit or supersede" the principal provisions of E-SIGN;2
 (ii) E-SIGN's extensive consumer consent provisions;3 and (iii) E-SIGN's
 provisions allowing federal and state regulatory agencies to "interpret" the
 Act, particularly in the context of the regulators' own existing and pro-
 posed rules on the use of electronic records and signatures.4 This Article
 * Robert A. Wittie is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Kirkpatrick & Lockhart
 LLP. Mr. Wittie was an observer for the drafting committee for the Uniform Electronic
 Transactions Act and represented investment company industry clients in connection with
 the legislation that became the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.
 He is a member of the ABA Section of Business Law's Committee on the Law of Cyberspace,
 the Investment Companies and Investment Advisers Subcommittee of the Federal Regulation
 of Securities Committee, and is a former chair of the Investment Securities Subcommittee
 of the Uniform Commercial Code Committee. Jane K. Winn is Professor of Law, Southern
 Methodist University, Dallas, Texas and author of The Law OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
 (4th ed. 2001 forthcoming). Professor Winn was an observer to the Uniform Electronic
 Transactions Act drafting committee and is a member of the ABA Section of Business Law's
 Committee on the Law of Cyberspace.
 1. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 106-229,
 1 14 Stat. 464 (2000) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7031) [hereinafter E-SIGN].
 2. Id. § 102(a).
 3. See id. S 101(c)(l).
 4. Id. § 104(b).
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 will explore those issues as part of a discussion of E-SIGN's substantive
 provisions and requirements and their relationship to comparable provi-
 sions in the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA).5
 BACKGROUND: THE NEED FOR CERTAINTY
 IN ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING AND
 RECORDS DELIVERY
 The need for something like E-SIGN goes back nearly twenty years, to
 when "electronic data interchange" (EDI) contracting was first imple-
 mented by U.S. businesses on a large scale. As businesses shifted their order
 processing systems from humans working with telephones, telexes, paper,
 and faxes to automated electronic contracting systems, concerns arose as
 to the enforceability of contracts formed by the exchange of electronic
 messages.6 Businesses with stable trading partner relationships could sign
 traditional paper agreements governing the exchange of messages between
 themselves, although it remained unclear whether this really resolved Stat-
 ute of Frauds and similar problems. More difficult problems arose, how-
 ever, when prospective contracting parties were not involved in a long-
 term trading partner relationship. Under those circumstances, the cost of
 executing a traditional signed agreement offline to validate online con-
 tracting would be prohibitive. The likelihood that prospective partners
 would find each other online and want to form a contract online vastly
 increased when the Internet replaced the old "value added networks" over
 which EDI messages were exchanged as the primary form of data network.
 Electronic contracting was no longer limited to businesses and their major
 trading partners - now, millions of consumers around the world could en-
 ter into online transactions.7
 In 1994, Utah became the first state to enact an electronic contracting
 law specifically designed to facilitate electronic transactions between par-
 5. Uniform Electronic Tranactions Act (1999), available at <http://www.
 nccusl.org> [hereinafter UETA]. References herein to "UETA" or "official UETA" are to
 the final text of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, approved and recommended for
 adoption by the states by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
 (NCCUSL) in 1999. References to "non-conforming UETA" are to any version of the Uni-
 form Electronic Transactions Act that is adopted by a state and that contains any amendment
 to or variation on official UETA, other than section numbering and other non-substantive
 changes in format.
 6. One of the leading sources of information on EDI contracting was published in The
 Business Lawyer. Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, American Bar Association, The
 Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange - A Report and Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 Bus.
 Law. 1645 (1990).
 7. For an analysis of the difference between old closed system electronic commerce and
 new open Internet electronic commerce, see Jane K. Winn, Open Systems, Free Markets and
 Regulation of Internet Commerce, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 1 1 77 (1998) available at <http://www.smu.edu/
 ~jwinn/esig.htm>.
This content downloaded from 205.175.118.27 on Mon, 08 Jan 2018 18:36:13 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Electronic Records and Signatures 295
 ties having no prior relationship.8 The Utah legislation was technology-
 specific, however, in that it focused on "digital signatures" - a term that
 was used to describe not a mere electronic version of a "signature" in the
 normal sense, but rather a specific authentication technology using asym-
 metric cryptography. The primary justification for laws such as Utah's was
 the presumed greater security and reliability of digital signature technology
 compared with other forms of electronic signature justification.9 In the
 years following Utah's enactment of its digital signature law in 1 994, how-
 ever, digital signature technology has not come into widespread use for
 Internet commerce except for electronic commerce server certificates used
 in "secure sockets layer" communications.10 In addition, there is now
 greater recognition that the security and reliability of digital signature tech-
 nology may be undermined if it is not properly incorporated into software
 applications, operating systems, and network technologies.
 While some states followed the Utah model,11 other states (as well as
 contemporaneous revisions to the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.))
 chose a media-neutral model of law reform that used the terms "record"
 and "authenticate" to replace traditional "writing" and "signature" re-
 quirements.12 Still other states enacted very narrow legislation targeted at
 8. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 46-3-201 to 46-3-504 (1998).
 9. The promise of digital signature technology to provide a highly secure and reliable
 form of electronic signature will only be met if the manner in which individuals are issued
 digital signatures certificates and the manner in which individuals access their digital signa-
 tures after they have been issued are highly secure and reliable. Few, if any, companies issuing
 digital signature certificates to the public in the United States today rigorously scrutinize an
 applicant's claim to be the person identified in the certificate. Few, if any, personal computers
 used by individuals in their homes or places of employment can be described as highly secure.
 Until these security flaws can be remedied, the ability of digital signature technology in theory
 to create a strong bond between a real world identity and an online signature will not be
 realized in practice.
 10. The "digital signature certificate" used in secure sockets layer communications iden-
 tifies a machine, not a person or legal entity. The certificate is used to bring up a secure
 communication session between a client computer, usually a personal computer running
 Internet browser software, and the server; it is not used to "sign" anything. See Jane K. Winn,
 Clash of the Titans: Regulating the Competition between Established and Emerging Electronic Payment Systems,
 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 675, 695 (1999), available at <http://www.smu.edu/~jwinn/clash-
 oftitans.htm>.
 11. See Minnesota Electronic Authorization Act, codified at MlNN. Stat. Ann. § 325K
 (West 2000); Mississippi Digital Signature Act of 1997, codified at Miss. Code Ann. §§ 25-
 63-1 to 25-63-11 (1999); Missouri Digital Signature Act, codified at Mo. Ann. Stat.
 §§ 28.600-28.684 (West 2000); New Mexico Electronic Authentication of Documents Act,
 codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. §§14-15-1 to 14-15-6 (Michie 1999); Washington Electronic
 Authentication Act, codified at Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 19.34.010 to 19.34.410 (West
 2000).
 12. See Oklahoma Electronic Records and Signatures Act of 1998, codified at Okla.
 Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§960-68 (West 2000); S.B. 525, 100th Gen. Assembly (Tenn. 1997),
 codified at Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 1-3-105, 29-2-101, and title 47; S.B. 819, 1999 Sess. (Va.
 1999), codified at Va. Code Ann. §§ 1-13.32 and 2.1-7.4 (Michie 2000)
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 authorizing electronic communications only in very specific contexts, such
 as certain types of citizen-government communications.13 Many states
 combined these approaches or did nothing at all.14
 In the face of this bewildering array of approaches to the problem, in
 1997, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
 (NCCUSL) undertook to produce a new uniform law that would bring
 some order and consistency to state legislation in this area. The NCCUSL
 drafting committee worked on a highly expedited drafting schedule, and
 a completed draft of UETA was finalized and approved in July 1999.15 By
 the time E-SIGN was enacted in June 2000, eighteen states had enacted
 UETA and it was under consideration in eleven more.16
 The federal government chose to act in this area, notwithstanding the
 availability of UETA, largely in response to urging by the high-tech and
 financial services industries, who were concerned by the amount of time
 it was likely to take before UETA could be truly adopted nationwide and
 by the continued adoption of laws widely divergent from UETA, even in
 major commercial jurisdictions such as New York. Perhaps most impor-
 tantly, these industries were concerned by the very substantial, non-uni-
 form modifications to the official text of UETA that were being made in
 some states and aggressively urged in others. In 1999, California became
 the first state to enact UETA, but only after making very substantial
 amendments to the official text of UETA.17 Consumer advocates in Cali-
 fornia succeeded in excluding a large number of state laws from the scope
 of UETA and changed many substantive provisions in ways that made it
 more difficult for businesses to use electronic media in communications in
 transactions with consumers.18
 13. See, e.g., Alabama Electronic Tax Return Filing Act, codified at Ala. Code §§ 40-30-1
 to 40-30-6 (2000) (authorizing the filing of electronic tax returns).
 1 4. As of August 2000, only Massachusetts and Michigan had not passed any electronic
 signature and electronic record enabling legislation. See McBride, Baker & Coles, Table 1,
 Scope of Authorization to Use of Electronic Signatures in Enacted Legislation (last modified Aug. 29, 2000),
 available at <http://www.mbc.com/ecommerce/legis/table01 .html>. Illinois combined the two
 approaches by including general enabling provisions with special treatment for more secure
 forms of electronic signatures. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act, codified at 5
 III. Comp. Stat. Ann. 175/5-105 to 175/5-145 (West 2000). This approach was copied
 in Iowa. See Iowa Electronic Commerce Security Act, H.R. 624, 78th Leg., 1st Sess. (Iowa
 1999), codified at Iowa Code Ann. §§ 554C.101-.501 (West 2000).
 15. The texts of current and prior Uniform Law Commissioners (ULC) drafts are avail-
 able on a web site maintained by the University of Pennsylvania. The Nat'l Conference of
 Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws, Drafts of Uniform and Model Acts Official Site (last modified
 Aug. 23, 2000), available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.htm>.
 lb. Intormation about the current status ot Uh, I A in state legislatures is available trom
 the NCCUSL Web site at <http://www.nccusl.org>. See also UETA Online web site, available
 at <http://www.uetaonline.com>.
 1 7. See Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, codified at CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 1633. 1-. 1 7
 (West 2000).
 18. For a discussion of the non-uniform amendments and their justifications, see Consum-
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 As a result, industry groups effectively brought UETA to Congress and
 asked that it be used as the model for federal law. While many E-SIGN
 provisions were based on comparable provisions in the UETA, they differ
 from the text of UETA in various ways. Many important provisions of
 UETA were not carried over to E-SIGN, and conversely, E-SIGN contains
 some provisions - most notably its consumer consent requirements - that
 are quite different than UETA. All of the differences between UETA and
 E-SIGN will raise significant interpretive issues as determinations must be
 made as to which state law provisions on electronic signatures and records
 are preempted by E-SIGN, and which UETA provisions "supersede" fed-
 eral law.
 The most important UETA provisions that were omitted from E-SIGN
 are those governing attribution of electronic signatures, the time when
 messages are deemed sent or received, mistakes in electronic contracting,
 admissibility of electronic records as evidence, electronic documents of title
 or promissory notes not secured by real property, and the manner in which
 paper processes will be converted to electronic processes by state govern-
 ments. These omissions leave states that have not yet adopted UETA with
 an important incentive to do so.
 E-SIGN's CORE PROVISIONS
 THE BASE RULE OF LEGAL PARITY
 The base E-SIGN rule, set forth in section 101 (a) of the Act, places
 electronic records and signatures on a legal par with their paper and ink
 counterparts.19 It provides that records and signatures relating to trans-
 actions in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce20 may not be denied
 legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because they are in electronic
 form or because an electronic signature or electronic record is used in their
 formation.21 Like UETA, from which most of its definitions are taken,
 ers Union, The California Exemptions to UETA, memo dated January 2000, available at <http://
 www.consumersunion.org/finance/9991wc00.htm>; Consumers Union, Uniform Electronic
 Transactions Act: Consumer Nightmare or Opportunity?, memo dated August 23, 1999, available at
 <http://www.consumersunion.org/finance/899nclcwc.htm>; and Consumers Union, Uni-
 form Electronic Transactions Act: Proposed amendments to protect consumers, memo dated September
 1999, available at <http://www.consumersunion.org/finance/uetawc899.htm>.
 19. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 101 (a).
 20. See infra notes 1 28-48 and accompanying text.
 21. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, §§ 101(a)(l) and (2); accord UETA, supra note 5, §§ 7(a) and
 (b). UETA adds two other formulations of this same substantive rule: if a law requires a
 record to be in writing, an electronic record satisfies the law, and if a law requires a signature,
 an electronic signature satisfies the law. See UETA, supra note 5, §§ 7(c) and (d). These pro-
 visions were drawn from the 1996 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce. See
 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment, UN. Doc. A/CN.9/
 SER.A/1996, with additional Article 5 bis as adopted in 1998, available at <http://
 www.uncitral.org/english/texts/electcom/index.htm>. The Model Law and its accompa-
 nying Guide to Enactment were also published in 7 Tul. J. Int'l & COMP. L. 237 (1999).
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 E-SIGN defines the terms "electronic record"22 and "electronic signa-
 ture"23 broadly and in technology-neutral terms. For purposes of the Act,
 nearly any electronic means of recording information may constitute an
 electronic record, and nearly any electronic evidence that a party has acted
 with the intent to sign a record may be an electronic signature. E-SIGN,
 again like UETA but unlike many other existing state laws,24 does not
 require the use of technologies that help verify either the identity of the
 signing party or the integrity of the record itself, and it does not accord
 preferred status to electronic records or signatures created using technol-
 ogies that do so.25 Indeed, E-SIGN places special limitations on the ability
 of states and both federal and state regulatory agencies to require or prefer
 the use of specific technologies.26
 While E-SIGN overrides both state and federal writing and signature
 requirements, it does not change the underlying, substantive law. It spec-
 22. An electronic record is defined to mean "a contract or other record created, generated,
 sent, communicated, received or stored by electronic means." E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 106(4);
 accord UETA, supra note 5, § 2(7). A "record" means "information that is inscribed on a
 tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in
 perceivable form." E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 106(9); accordUETA, supra note 5, § 2(13).
 23. An electronic signature is defined to mean "an electronic sound, symbol, or process
 attached to or logically associated with a contract or other record and executed or adopted
 by a person with the intent to sign the record." E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 106(5); accord UETA,
 supra note 5, § 2(8).
 24. A small number of states require the use of a specific technology to make an electronic
 signature in order to receive legal recognition. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 46-3-201 to 46-
 3-504 (1998); 5 III. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1 75/5-105 to 1 75/5-145 (West 2000). A substantially
 larger number of states passed laws that set forth standards an electronic signature must meet
 before receiving legal recognition in such a manner that digital signatures clearly meet the
 standard but that do not refer to a specific technology. These standards usually require that
 an authentication method be unique to the person using it, be capable of verification, be
 under the sole control of the person using it, and be linked to the signed record in such a
 manner that if the contents of the record are changed, the signature will be invalidated. See,
 e.g., S.B. 232, 20th Leg., 2d. Sess., codified at Alaska Stat. §§ 09.25.500 to 09.25.520
 (Michie 1998); Georgia Electronic Records and Signatures Act, codified at Ga. Code Ann.
 §§10-12-1 to 10-12-5 (1999 Supp.); H.B. 708 (Ky. 1998), codified at Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
 §§ 369.010 to 369.030 (1999); Nebraska Digital Signatures Act, codified at Neb. Rev. Stat.
 §86-1701 Ü999).
 25. One of the first detailed statements of the technology-specific approach is contained
 in the ABA Digital Signatures Guidelines, which were published in 1996. Information Se-
 curity Committee, ABA Section of Science and Technology, Digital Signature Guidelines 1996,
 available at <http://www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/dsgfree.html>. For an overview of ar-
 guments supporting a more technology-specific approach, see Thomas J. Smedinghoff &
 Ruth Hill Bro, Moving With Change: Electronic Signature Legislation as a Vehicle for Advancing
 E-Commerce, 17 J. Marshall COMPUTER & Info. L. Rev. 723 (1999). For a critique of such
 provisions as unfair and economically inefficient, see Comment from Carl Ellison & Jane
 Kaufman Winn to the Federal Trade Commission on Consumer Protection in the Global
 Electronic Marketplace (Mar. 26, 1999), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/
 comments/revwin~ 1 .htm>.
 2b. See E-5IGJN, supra note 1,^1 U^(a)(^)(A)(n) and 1 U4-(b)(^)((J)(m). See also injra notes 1 Sb-
 7 1 and accompanying text.
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 ifies that Title I of the Act27 does not "limit, alter, or otherwise affect any
 requirement . . . relating to the rights and obligations of persons" that is
 imposed under other law "other than a requirement that contracts or other
 records be written, signed, or in nonelectronic form."28 For example, there
 are no changes to the content or timing of notices or disclosures that must
 be provided pursuant to federal or state law in connection with any trans-
 action. To avoid doubt regarding what probably would otherwise have
 been regarded as a particular application of this rule, the Act also specifies
 that Title I does not affect the "proximity" required by other law with
 respect to "any warning, notice, disclosure, or other record required to be
 posted, displayed, or publicly affixed."29 This provision was intended to
 ensure, for example, that a hazard warning can still be required to be
 displayed on or near an item, even if it is electronic.30
 VOLUNTARY USE AND ACCEPTANCE
 Under E-SIGN, both the use and acceptance of electronic records and
 signatures is voluntary. It specifies that, subject to an exception for gov-
 ernment agencies, Title I of the Act does not "require any person to agree
 to use or accept electronic records or electronic signatures."31
 Outside the context of required consumer consents,32 E-SIGN does not
 affirmatively require that there be any agreement to use or accept elec-
 tronic records or signatures in order for them to be valid and effective.
 Rather, E-SIGN's rule is negative, providing only that parties are not
 required to use or accept them.33 The mere fact of use, or of behavior
 consistent with acceptance, by a party should be sufficient to evidence that
 27. Title I contains all of the Act's provisions governing the use of electronic records and
 signatures other than the special provisions on "transferable records," which are contained
 in Title II. See id. §§ 101-107; 201; infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text. Title III of
 E-SIGN directs the Secretary of Commerce to promote certain, specified principles for the
 acceptance and use of electronic signatures on an international basis, see id. § 301, while Title
 IV contains a non-germane provision amending section 1405 of the Child Online Protection
 Act, to allow the Commission on Online Child Protection to accept, use, and dispose of gifts
 and bequests for the purpose of aiding or facilitating its work. See id. § 40 1 .
 28. Id. § 101 (b). UETA reaches the same substantive result by providing that transactions
 subject to UETA are "also subject to other applicable substantive law." UETA, supra note
 5, § 3(d).
 29. E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 101(f); cf. UETA, supra note 5, § 8(b)(l), which does not ref-
 erence "proximity" but requires that electronic records comply with requirements under
 other law that records be "posted or displayed in [a certain] manner."
 30. E-SIGN, however, expressly excepts from its coverage any document that is "required
 to accompany any transportation or handling of hazardous materials, pesticides, or other
 toxic or dangerous materials." E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 103(b)(3). Such documentation can
 still be required to be in paper form so as, for example, to be easily and readily readable by
 passers-by or by emergency personnel in the event of an accident.
 31. Id. § 101(b)(2).
 32. See id. § 101(c). See also infra notes 54-90 and accompanying text.
 33. See id. § 101(b)(2).
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 party's willingness and to make applicable E-SIGN's base rule. This is
 slightly different from UETA, which provides that it applies only to trans-
 actions between parties "each of which has agreed to conduct transactions
 by electronic means."34 The practical impact of this distinction, however,
 is likely to be small, because the agreement required under UETA may
 be implicit and may be "determined from the context and surrounding
 circumstances, including the parties' conduct."35 As indicated in the Of-
 ficial Comments to UETA, the "critical element" to finding the existence
 of such an agreement is "the intent of a party to conduct a transaction
 electronically."36 The existence of such an intent is likely to be implicit in
 the same behavior that, under E-SIGN, would evidence that a person has
 in fact used or accepted the use of an electronic record or signature. Nev-
 ertheless, the reach of E-SIGN in this respect is slightly greater than that
 of UETA.
 By specifying that the use and acceptance of electronic records and
 signatures is voluntary, E-SIGN effectively preserves the autonomy of
 private parties to agree to limitations on, or specific criteria for, their use.
 While the Act limits the government's ability to require or give preferential
 treatment to specific technologies, such as digital signatures, public key
 infrastructures, or other commercial applications of cryptography,37 it
 does not limit the ability of individual parties to require their use in their
 own transactions.38 In this manner, E-SIGN incorporates by implication
 the essence of autonomy provisions that had been contained in the
 House and Senate bills39 that were refashioned by a joint conference
 34. UETA, supra note 5, § 5(b).
 35. Id.
 36. Id. Comments 3 and 4 make clear that the circumstances are to be construed liberally
 to find the requisite intent. For example, the Comments indicate that sufficient intent may
 be evidenced by the fact that a party to a transaction has provided the other with a business
 card containing his e-mail address. Id. cmt. 4, example B.
 37. For a general description of public key cryptography and digital signatures, see, e.g.,
 Jane K. Winn & Benjamin Wright, The Law of Electronic Commerce § 1.04[E]
 (4th ed. 2001 forthcoming), available at <http://www.smu.edu/~jwinn/LawEcomm4thed.
 htm>; Simson Garfinkel with Gene Spafford, Web Security and Commerce 187-
 208 (1998); Warwick Ford & Michael S. Baum, Secure Electronic Commerce
 (1997).
 38. This legislation is, appropriately, technology neutral. It leaves it to the parties to choose
 the authentication technology that meets their needs. At the same time, it is undeniable
 that some authentication technologies are more secure than others. Nothing in the
 conference report prevents or in any way discourages parties from considering issues
 of security when deciding which authentication technology to use for a particular
 application. Indeed, such considerations are wholly appropriate.
 146 Cong. Rec. S5222 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
 39. See H.R. 1714, 106th Cong. § 101(b)(l)(A) (1999) ("the parties to [aj contract, agree-
 ment, or record may establish procedures or requirements regarding the use and acceptance
 of electronic records and electronic signatures acceptable to such parties"); S. 761, 106th
 Cong. § 5(b) (1999) ("Parties to a transaction are permitted to determine the appropriate
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 report40 to become the Act, without affecting any other rules of law, such
 as those governing unconscionable contracts, that might limit the enforce-
 ability of parties5 agreements.
 Governmental agencies acting outside the context of their own contracts
 are excluded from the general rule of voluntary use or acceptance.41 Pre-
 sumably, this exclusion was intended to reflect congressional recognition
 that implicit in allowing private parties to use electronic records and sig-
 natures is a limitation on the ability of governmental agencies to object to
 that use - in other words, governmental agencies must "accept" private
 parties' use of electronic records. Nevertheless, the scope and impact of
 this exclusion is unclear. The exclusion applies not only to the "accep-
 tance," but also to the "use" of electronic records and signatures. Yet,
 there is no indication in the legislative history that this exclusion was in-
 tended to impose an affirmative obligation on governmental agencies to
 use electronic records themselves, and at least one other provision in the
 Act suggests that this is not the case.42
 Moreover, it is apparent that, just as for private parties, it is not feasible
 to require governmental agencies to fully accommodate any and every
 choice of electronic commerce technologies made by private parties.
 E-SIGN accommodates this reality by specifying that regulatory agencies
 may prescribe rules governing the use of electronic records for record
 keeping purposes,43 and by allowing agencies to establish "standards and
 formats" for electronic filings.44 Uncertainty is exacerbated, however, by
 the fact that E-SIGN does not clearly distinguish between the obligation
 of government agencies to accept submissions from private parties that
 must be filed with the government in order to be effective, and the obli-
 gation of government agencies to accept records maintained by private
 parties in the performance of review or audit functions.
 SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS
 E-SIGN imposes only a few affirmative requirements on the use of
 electronic records and signatures. The most notable of these, each of which
 is discussed at greater length below, are the consumer consent require-
 electronic signature technologies for their transaction, and the means of implementing such
 technologies.").
 40. &*H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 106-661 (2000).
 41. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 101 (b)(2) (excluding "a governmental agency with respect
 to a record other than a contract to which it is a party").
 42. See id. § 104(c)(2) (indicating that federal regulatory agencies continue to be subject to
 the timetables for the use of electronic records that were established by the Government
 Paperwork Elimination Act (Pub. L. No. 105-277, title XVII)).
 43. See id. § 104(b)(3). See also infra notes 91-108 and accompanying text.
 44. E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 104(a). But see infra notes 109-1 15 and accompanying text, as
 to the potential impact of this exception on the ability of federal and state agencies to require
 filings to be made on paper.
This content downloaded from 205.175.118.27 on Mon, 08 Jan 2018 18:36:13 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 302 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 56, November 2000
 ments that apply to the electronic delivery of required written information
 to consumers,45 the provisions governing electronic record keeping,46 and
 the provisions governing transferable records.47 In addition, E-SIGN im-
 poses affirmative requirements on records used to satisfy writing require-
 ments, on signatures used to satisfy notarization or similar verification
 requirements, and on compliance with pre-existing rules requiring a con-
 firmation of receipt.
 Section 101(e) of the Act specifies that, if other law requires:
 a contract or other record relating to a transaction in or affecting
 interstate or foreign commerce to be in writing, the legal effect, va-
 lidity, or enforceability of an electronic record of such contract or
 other record may be denied if such electronic record is not in a form
 that is capable of being retained and accurately reproduced for later
 reference by all parties or persons who are entitled to retain the con-
 tract or other record.48
 E-SIGN does not specify who is "entitled to retain" a record, and it does
 not create any such entitlement itself, thus leaving the matter to other law.
 Because the common law and the Statute of Frauds generally do not entitle
 anyone to retain a copy of a contract, the practical impact of section 101 (e)
 45. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 101(c). See also infra notes 54-90 and accompanying text.
 46. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 101 (d). See also infra notes 91-108 and accompanying text.
 47. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 201. See also infra notes 1 16-20 and accompanying text.
 48. E-SIGN, supra note 1, § lOl(e). Whether or not legal ellect actually will be denied
 depends on other law, including the common law and any applicable state or federal statutes
 or regulations, any of which might provide that the electronic record is the legal equivalent
 of a "writing." The phrase "may be denied" is in marked contrast to the phrase "shall be
 denied," as used in the comparable provision of S. 761, as originally passed by the Senate.
 S. 761, 106th Cong. § 5(c) (1999).
 This rule is comparable to, but differs in important respects from, UETA sections 8(a) and
 (c). UETA section 8(c) provides that an electronic record is "not enforceable against the
 recipient" if the sender "inhibits the ability of the recipient to store or print" it. UETA, supra
 note 5, § 8(c). This is more limited than E-SIGN section 101(e) in two respects. First, it covers
 only those instances in which the sender affirmatively inhibits storage or printing by the
 recipient, such as by using a system designed to prevent reproduction in order to preserve
 copyrights irrespective of the capacity of the hardware and software used by the recipient.
 See id. §8 cmt. 5. Second, UETA section 8(c) applies only to enforceability, a concept that is
 primarily applicable only to contracts and that is legally distinct from legal effectiveness and
 validity. See id.; see also Restatement (Second) OF Contracts § 8 (1981) (distinguishing
 between "voidable" and "unenforceable" contracts).
 UETA section 8(a) provides that the electronic delivery of information will satisfy a re-
 quirement to deliver the record in writing only if the electronic record is "capable of retention
 by the recipient at the time of receipt." UETA, supra note 5, § 8(a). Thus, unlike E-SIGN
 section 101(e), UETA section 8(a) does not provide for denying the validity, enforceability,
 or legal effect of an electronic record itself, but relates to the criteria for electronic delivery.
 See id. Also, UETA section 8(a) requires only that the record be "capable of retention," not
 that it be reproducible, and speaks of retention "by the recipient at the time of receipt," not
 merely of any party that may be "entitled to retain" the record. Id.
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 is likely to be limited to records that consumer protection or similar laws
 specifically require to be provided to a party in a form that they may
 retain.49 Moreover, section 101(e) does not require that the electronic re-
 cords actually be retained or that the entitled party actually have the ability
 to retain or reproduce the record. Rather, it requires only that the form
 of electronic record be one that could be retained or reproduced by a
 person having the appropriate hardware and software.50 Thus, section
 101(e) is essentially an elaboration on the definition of the term "record,"
 which must be "retrievable in perceivable form."51
 E-SIGN section 1 0 1 (g) imposes specific requirements for electronic sig-
 natures that are used to satisfy requirements that records be notarized,
 acknowledged, verified, or made under oath. The section expressly allows
 electronic signatures to be used to satisfy such requirements, but only if
 the electronic signature of the notary or other authorized person is at-
 tached to or logically associated with a record of all of the information,
 such as a form of attestation, recitals, or identifying information about a
 notary, that is required to be provided under the applicable notarization
 or similar law.52
 Finally, E-SIGN section 101(c)(2)(B) requires that if a law enacted prior
 to the Act "expressly requires a record to be provided or made available
 by a specified method that requires verification or acknowledgment of
 receipt," the information may be provided electronically "only if the
 method used provides verification or acknowledgment of receipt."53 While
 this requirement is contained within the section of the Act relating to
 consumer consents, it is not limited to information provided to consumers.
 REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIAL USES: CONSUMER
 CONSENTS, RECORDS RETENTION, FILINGS, AND
 TRANSFERABLE RECORDS
 CONSUMER CONSENT REQUIREMENTS
 General
 E-SIGN requires that consumers54 affirmatively consent before elec-
 tronic records can be used to provide them with information that, under
 49. For example, Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z requires that truth-in-lending dis-
 closures be "in a form that the consumer may keep." 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a)(l) (2000).
 50. In contrast, the consumer consent provisions, discussed in the text, infra notes 51-86,
 require that consumers be advised of the hardware and software that they will need in order
 for them to access and retain records that they consent to receive.
 51. E-SIGN, suòra note 1, S 106(9).
 52. See id. § 101 (g); accord UET A, supra note 5, § 1 1.
 53. Id. § 101(c)(2)(B). It is not clear whether this reference is to June 30, 2000, which was
 the enactment date of the Act, or to October 1 , 2000, which is the effective date for most of
 the Act's provisions. The conservative view would be the October 1 effective date, since that
 would give broader effect to the requirement.
 54. E-SIGN defines "consumer" as an "individual who obtains, through a transaction,
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 other law, must be provided or made available to them in writing. The Act
 specifies that, if the required consent is obtained following the provision
 of the disclosure mandated under the Act, the use of an electronic record
 to provide or make available the required written information "satisfies
 the requirement that such information be in writing."55 Nothing in the
 consent or other provisions of Title I of the Act, however, affects the "con-
 tent or timing" of any of the information that is required to be provided.56
 Even in the context of consumer transactions, the consumer consent
 provisions apply in limited circumstances. They apply only to electronic
 records that are provided or made available to consumers, not to electronic
 records that are obtained^m them. No consent is required with respect
 to an electronic record of a contract, application, or related form that
 is electronically signed and submitted to a vendor by a consumer, ex-
 cept of course to the extent that the validity of that record depends upon
 the consumer receiving written information that the vendor provides
 electronically.
 Moreover, the consumer's consent is required only with respect to elec-
 tronic records that are used to satisfy a legal requirement that information
 be provided or made available to a consumer in writing. No consent is
 required before providing consumers with electronic information that is
 not required to be provided to them or that is not required to be provided
 in writing. For example, at least in non-regulated contexts, sales literature
 and contracts normally can be provided to consumers electronically with-
 out obtaining any E-SIGN consent because no law requires that they be
 provided, either in writing or at all. Even sales literature provided in con-
 nection with an offering under the federal securities laws could be provided
 to a consumer electronically without an E-SIGN consent, since again, no
 law requires that sales literature be provided in writing. To the extent that
 the securities laws require that such sales literature be accompanied or pre-
 ceded by a written prospectus,57 however, E-SIGN normally would require
 the consumer's consent to the electronic provision of that prospectus.
 products or services which are used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes."
 Id. § 106(1).
 55. Id. § 10 l(c)(l); cf. UETA, supra note 5, § 8(a) (providing that a legal requirement to
 "provide, send, or deliver information in writing to another person ... is satisfied if the
 information is provided, sent, or delivered, as the case may be, in an electronic record capable
 of retention by the recipient at the time of receipt").
 56. E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 101(c)(2)(A).
 57. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (1994) (providing, effectively, that a registrant's sales litera-
 ture will not constitute a "prospectus" if it is accompanied or preceded by a written, statutory
 prospectus). Note, however, that other provisions in the Securities Act, as well as the SEC's
 existing interpretive guidelines allowing electronic prospectus delivery, may mean that the
 required prospectus need not be provided "in writing" for purposes of E-SIGN. See infra notes
 207-21 and accompanying text.
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 E-SIGN permits federal regulatory agencies to exempt specific catego-
 ries or types of records from the consent requirements,58 and it directs the
 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to use that exemptive au-
 thority to allow registered investment companies to provide a statutory
 prospectus to consumers in connection with the provision of fund sales
 literature without having to obtain the E-SIGN consent.59 The SEC was
 required to issue a regulation or order exempting such prospectuses within
 thirty days from enactment of the Act, i.e., by July 30, 2000, and it did so,
 adopting on an interim final basis, new Securities Act Rule 160.60 This
 rule, which like E-SIGN, became effective on October 1, 2000, allows
 funds to continue to use hyperlinks and similar techniques, as currently
 permitted under the SEC's electronic delivery guidelines, to ensure that
 sales literature appearing on their web sites is accompanied by or preceded
 by the fund's prospectus without insisting that potential investors first con-
 sent to the electronic delivery of the prospectus.
 The E-SIGN consent requirements do not apply to the electronic pro-
 vision of records pursuant to consents obtained prior to October 1, as long
 as those prior consents were permitted by existing laws or regulations.61
 Thus, providers may continue to rely on any consents that they obtain
 prior to October 1 pursuant to the electronic delivery guidelines already
 established by the SEC or other agencies regulating their activities, but
 only with respect to the items that are covered by those consents.
 Electronic Consent; Reasonable Demonstration of
 Consumer's Ability to Access
 E-SIGN does not require that a consumer's consent be provided in any
 particular form, at least in the first instance. If the consumer's consent is
 not electronic, however, it must be confirmed electronically, and either an
 electronic consent or an electronic confirmation of the consent must be
 given "in a manner that reasonably demonstrates that the consumer can
 access information in the electronic form" in which the records covered
 by the consent will be provided.62
 The Act does not elaborate on what would be sufficient to "reasonably
 demonstrate" such access, although a literal reading of the statutory lan-
 guage suggests that the demonstration must be effected by the consent or
 confirmation itself. For example, a consent in the form of checking an "I
 consent" box in a Word 2000 document that was sent to the consumer as
 58. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 104(d)(l).
 59. See id. § 104(d)(2).
 60. See Exemption from Section 101 (c)( 1 ) of the Electronic Signatures in Global and Na-
 tional Commerce for Registered Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 7877,
 [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) J 86,316 (July 24, 2000).
 61. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 101(c)(4).
 62. See id. § lOlfcXlXCXii).
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 part of the request for consent presumably would reasonably evidence the
 consumer's ability to access electronic records that are in the form of Word
 2000 documents. Obtaining such self-validating consents, however, may
 be impractical. For example, a document might be provided to a consumer
 by means of a download from a web site in a "read-only" format, such as
 the Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF). The consumer would not
 be able to confirm access to such a document by checking an "I consent"
 box and returning the PDF document over the Internet. Moreover, when
 consent is sought for the use of several electronic formats to provide a
 variety of records at future dates, such as may occur when a banking,
 brokerage, or other account relationship is being established, obtaining a
 self-validating consent for each format would likely necessitate multiple
 consents - a result that neither businesses nor consumers are likely to want.
 Legislative history, however, indicates that this provision of E-SIGN
 should be understood to impose only a more flexible requirement. Col-
 loquies between key House and Senate conferees reflect their intent and
 understanding that the reasonable demonstration required by the Act may
 result from an e-mailed affirmation from the consumer that he or she has
 been able to access sample records in the electronic forms that would be
 used in the future.63 The "demonstration" would come from the con-
 sumer's affirmation following an opportunity to test a sample record, not
 from any intrinsic proof that the affirmation is accurate.64 The colloquies
 also indicate that a reasonable demonstration may result from evidence
 that the consumer has actually accessed the relevant type of electronic
 records, irrespective of whether the consumer affirms his or her ability to
 do so.65
 63. See 146 Cong. Rec. H4360 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (colloquy between Reps. Bliley
 and Markey); 146 Cong. Rec. S5282 (daily ed. June 16, 2000) (colloquy between Sens.
 McCain and Abraham). See also 146 Cong. Rec. H4358 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement
 of Rep. Dingell) (noting the required "one-time 'electronic check' can be as simple as an
 e-mail to the customer asking the customer confirm that he was able to open the attachment
 (if the company plans to send notices to the customer via e-mail attachments) and a reply
 from the customer confirming that he or she was able to open the attachment").
 64. To at least one Senator, the fact that the affirmation results from a two-way commu-
 nication is essential.
 [The provision] means there is a two-way street. It is not sufficient for the vendor to tell
 the consumer what type of computer or software he or she needs. It is not sufficient for
 the consumer merely to tell the vendor in an e-mail that he or she can access the
 information in the specified formats. There must be meaningful two-way communica-
 tion electronically between the vendor and consumer.
 146 Cong. Rec. S5216 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement of Sen. Wyden).
 65. See 146 Cong. Rec. H4360 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (colloquy between Reps. Bliley
 and Markey); 146 Cong. Rec. S5282 (daily ed. June 16, 2000) (colloquy between Sens.
 McCain and Abraham).
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 The Act provides that the legal effectiveness, validity, or enforceability
 of a contract executed by a consumer may not be denied "solely" because
 of a failure to obtain an electronic consent or confirmation that complies
 with the reasonable demonstration requirement.66 If the validity of a con-
 tract depends on the provision of a written notice, disclosure, or other
 information to a consumer, and if that information is provided by means
 of an electronic record after obtaining the consumer's affirmative consent
 in accordance with all other E-SIGN requirements, the mere fact that the
 consent was not given or confirmed electronically or in a manner that
 reasonably demonstrated that the consumer could access information in
 the relevant electronic form will not invalidate the contract. This savings
 clause, however, does no more than preserve the validity of the related
 contract. It does not protect funds or other providers of electronic records
 from any potential liability (as, for example, under any applicable fair trade
 laws) or from regulatory sanctions that might result from failing to provide
 the required information "in writing," as required by law.67
 The practical value to consumers of the E-SIGN consumer consent
 provisions remains to be seen. As evidenced by the "reasonable demon-
 stration" provision and the disclosure requirements described below, they
 place a high compliance burden on businesses. At the same time, they may
 frustrate, rather than empower, consumers, who will need to wade through
 lengthy and perhaps repetitive consent forms in order to do business elec-
 tronically. Acknowledging that it is at least possible that the cost-benefit
 trade-off under the consent requirements may prove inappropriate,
 E-SIGN requires the Secretary of Commerce and the Federal Trade Com-
 mission (FTC) to evaluate the Act's electronic consent and "reasonable
 demonstration" provisions over the next year. By July 1, 2001, they must
 report to Congress as to: (i) any benefits that those provisions provide to
 consumers; (ii) any burdens that those provisions impose on electronic
 commerce; (iii) whether the benefits outweigh the burdens; (iv) whether
 the absence of those provisions would increase the incidence of consumer
 fraud; and (v) any revisions to those provisions that they deem appropri-
 ate.68 In making their evaluation, the Secretary and the FTC are required
 to solicit comment from the general public and, more specifically, from
 consumer representatives and electronic commerce businesses.
 66. E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 101(c)(3).
 67. While not affecting the continued validity of the contract, "[fjailure to obtain elec-
 tronic consent or confirmation of consent would . . . prevent a company from relying on
 section 101 (a) to validate an electronic record that was required to be provided or made
 available to the consumer in writing." 146 Cong. Rec. S5220 (daily ed. June 15, 2000)
 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
 bö. b-ölCjJN, supra note I, § lUo(b). lhe Act also requires that, within the same period,
 the Secretary of Commerce conduct an inquiry and report to Congress as to the effectiveness
 of the delivery of electronic records to consumers specifically by means of electronic mail, as
 compared with delivery of written records by the U.S. Postal Service. See id. § 105(a).
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 Disclosure and Other Consent Requirements
 E-SIGN requires that any consumer consent must be withdrawable and
 must not have been withdrawn.69 The Act, however, specifies that a with-
 drawal of consent will not affect the validity of any electronic records
 provided while the consent was in effect.70 Moreover, withdrawal of con-
 sent will not be effective until the provider has had a reasonable period
 following receipt of notice to implement the withdrawal.71
 In addition, the consumer consent must be preceded by a "clear and
 conspicuous" statement72 that informs the consumer of:
 • Any right that the consumer has to receive the record in non-elec-
 tronic form;73
 • The consumer's right to withdraw the consent and any conditions,
 consequences (which may include termination of the parties' rela-
 tionship), or fees that would result from such a withdrawal;74
 • The categories of electronic records that may be provided or made
 available pursuant to the consent during the course of the parties'
 relationship, or if the consent covers only the particular transaction
 giving rise to the obligation to provide the record, a statement to
 that effect;75
 • The procedures the consumer must use to withdraw consent and
 to update the consumer's electronic address;76
 • How, after consenting, the consumer may obtain a paper copy of
 any electronic record and whether a fee will be charged for provid-
 ing it;77 and
 69. See id. § 101(c)(l)(A).
 70. See id. § 101(c)(4).
 71. See id.
 72. Id. § 101(c)(l)(B). The Act does not specify what constitutes a "clear and conspicuous"
 statement, but analogies are readily available under other law. For example, privacy regula-
 tions adopted by the SEC and the federal banking agencies define "clear and conspicuous"
 to mean that "a notice is reasonably understandable and designed to call attention to the
 nature and significance of the information in the notice." Privacy of Consumer Financial
 Information (Regulation S-P), 65 Fed. Reg. 40,334, 40,363 (2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
 §248.3(c)(l)).
 73. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 101(c)(l)(B)(i)(I). Since the consumer consent requirement
 applies only to information that is required by law to be provided in writing, this presumably
 will amount to a recitation ofthat legal requirement, coupled with an indication of whether
 the provider is willing to do business with the consumer on a non-electronic basis.
 74. See id. § 101(c)(l)(B)(i)(II).
 75. See id. § 1 0 1 (c)( 1 )(B)(ii). Curiously, the Act does not specify that the records or categories
 of records covered by the consent must be identified if they all will relate to the particular
 transaction. It is not clear whether this distinction was intended.
 76. See id. § 101(c)(l)(B)(iii).
 77. See id. §101(c)(l)(B)(iv). By requiring a statement of "how," rather than "whether" a
 consumer may obtain a paper copy of the record, the Act imposes a requirement that paper
 copies be available, albeit for a fee. This is not the same, however, as requiring that providers
 be willing to do business on a basis that will require the record to be provided in paper form
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 • The hardware and software requirements for access to and reten-
 tion of the electronic records.78
 If, following the consumer's consent, there is a change in the previously
 disclosed hardware or software requirements, and that change creates a
 "material risk" that the consumer will not be able to access or retain a
 subsequent electronic record, the provider of electronic records must:
 • Provide the consumer with a statement of the new hardware and
 software requirements and of the consumer's right to withdraw con-
 sent without the imposition of any fees or any new conditions or
 consequences;79 and
 • Obtain a new electronic consent or a reconfirmation that again
 reasonably demonstrates that the consumer can access information
 in the electronic forms in which the records will be provided.80
 E-SIGN section 101(c)(6) specifies that neither an oral communication
 nor a recording of an oral communication may constitute an electronic
 record for purposes of section 101(c) "except as otherwise provided under
 applicable law."81 The inclusion of this prohibition seems to have been the
 result of an almost theological view that telephonic notices are inherently
 inadequate to protect consumers.82 However, while proponents of the pro-
 vision seemed to assume that consumers could not preserve, refer to, and
 use recordings of oral communications to demonstrate what information
 was provided to them, it is not evident why this is so.83 Like any other
 in the first instance. Thus, as a condition of doing business, providers may insist on obtaining
 a consent that will enable them to satisfy their legal obligation to provide a "written" record
 to a consumer by electronic means. They must, however, be willing to subsequently provide
 a paper copy of the record, if so requested, at least for a fee.
 78. See id. § 101(c)(l)(C)(i). E-SIGN does not specify that this statement be "clear and
 conspicuous."
 79. See id. § 101(c)(l)(D)(i). Note that the required disclosures contemplate that a provider
 may assess a fee if a consumer's consent is withdrawn in the ordinary course but may not do
 so if consent is withdrawn following a change in the hardware and software requirements.
 While the provider may not impose any new conditions or other consequences for a with-
 drawal following such a change, it may, however, impose the conditions and consequences
 (other than fees) orietinally disclosed pursuant to subsection (l)(B)(i)(II).
 80. See id. § 101(c)(l)(D)(ii). Presumably a failure of a consumer to provide the required re-
 consent or re-confirmation would constitute a "withdrawal" of consent for purposes of sub-
 section (l)(D)(i), thereby allowing the provider to impose any conditions and consequences
 (other than fees) that were originally disclosed. Otherwise, the limitations on charging orig-
 inally disclosed withdrawal fees would need to be read, illogically, as applying to any post-
 change withdrawal even if unrelated to, and substantially later than, the change in hardware
 or software.
 81. Id. § 101(c)(6).
 82. Thus, a key advocate of the consent provisions noted that section 1 0 1 (c)(6) was "added
 at the request of the Democratic conferees" because "oral notice over the telephone will
 never be sufficient to protect consumer interests." 146 Cong. Rec. S5220 (daily ed. June
 15, 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
 83. See id.
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 "record," a recording of an oral communication would qualify as an "elec-
 tronic record" only if it is "retrievable in perceivable form," and the con-
 sent provisions themselves require that the consumer be advised of the
 requirements to both access and retain the electronic records that are
 provided.84 There is no apparent reason why such records, which may or
 may not use sounds as an input or output, would not accomplish the
 consumer protective purposes with which the proponents of the prohibi-
 tion were concerned.85
 If the E-SIGN section 101(c)(6) prohibition on using oral communica-
 tions or recordings of them for purposes of providing information covered
 by the consent provisions is read to cover more than simple audio record-
 ings, it is likely to prove unduly limiting and to constitute a significant
 obstacle to the evolution of electronic commerce. Technologies are rapidly
 evolving to include the use of cell phones and voice-activated technologies
 as a platform for the receipt and delivery of information. While cell phone
 electronic commerce today relies heavily on a tiny visual display of text,
 in subsequent iterations it is likely to rely on a text-to-speech function that
 will play text to the user, as well as interactive voice response systems that
 receive spoken inputs from the user. Cell phones today are widely used to
 execute transactions in Europe and Japan,86 and the likelihood that large
 numbers of consumers in the United States will have access to, and will
 demand this technology in the near future is quite high.87
 It is not certain, however, how broadly this prohibition will be read to
 apply. The explanation of the legislation submitted by the chief Senate
 sponsor of the Act stated that the prohibition does not disqualify "oral
 communications that are . . . created or stored in a digital format."88 Rec-
 ognizing the direction of technological evolution, the statement went on
 to note that the prohibition "is not intended to create an impediment to
 voice-based technologies, which are certain to be an important component
 of the emerging mobile-commerce market."89
 Regardless of the breadth accorded to the prohibition contained in sec-
 tion 101(c)(6), some relief from its limiting effects come from its specific
 exception for uses permitted under other applicable law. This exception
 appears to allow federal regulators to separately determine whether oral
 84. Id. § 106(9). See id. § 101(c)(l)(C)(i).
 85. Taken literally, E-SIGN's section 101(c)(6) prohibition would seem to preclude pro-
 viding audio recordings of required "written" information to the blind. See id. § 101(c)(6).
 While alternatives such as Braille obviously exist, it is hard to fathom the public policy served
 by this.
 86. See, e.g., Donovan Webster, The Watch That Is Tour Lifeline to the World, N.Y TIMES Mag.,
 June 11, 2000, at 87.
 87. See Walter Mossberg, Personal Technology- A Long Love Affair With the
 PC Might Be Holding Back the U.S., Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 2000, at B 1 .
 88. 146 Cong. Rec. S5284 (daily ed. June 16, 2000) (statement of Sen. Abraham).
 89. Id.
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 communications or recordings may be used to provide consumers with
 information required under the laws they administer,90 as well as to defer
 to current or future statutes which may allow such use.
 USE OF ELECTRONIC RECORDS TO SATISFY RECORD
 RETENTION REQUIREMENTS
 E-SIGN specifically provides that electronic records may be used to
 satisfy record retention requirements that are imposed under other law.91
 Electronic records that are so retained must:
 • Accurately reflect the information set forth in the record;92 and
 • Remain accessible, for such period as is required under other law
 and in a form that allows the record to be accurately reproduced,
 to all persons who are entitled under other law to access the
 record.93
 If a rule of evidence or other law requires that an "original" document
 must be retained or produced, an electronic record will meet that require-
 ment if it meets these accuracy and accessibility requirements.94
 Like UETA, E-SIGN has a special rule for the retention of canceled
 checks. It provides that if the information on the front and back of a paper
 check is stored in electronic form in a manner that meets the accuracy
 and accessibility requirements of E-SIGN, it will satisfy a canceled check
 90. Recently promulgated guidelines and regulations already permit this. See, e.g., Use of
 Electronic Media, Securities Act Release No. 7856, 72 SEC Docket 753, [Current Binder]
 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) U 86,304, at 83,391-92 (Apr. 28, 2000) (examples 1 and 2) (allowing
 informed consent to be provided over the telephone after required information is provided
 through automated, telephonic instructions or in a live conversation); New Technologies in
 Retirement Plans, Internal Revenue Service Regulation 402(f), 26 C.F.R. § l-402(f)-l (Q&A"
 6) (2000) (allowing employee benefit plan administrators to provide required distribution
 information by means of an automated voice response system (or by a human reading from
 a script in a live telephone call) in lieu of providing that information in writing). Even in its
 original 1 995 release allowing the use of electronic media to satisfy requirements to provide
 information under the federal securities laws, the SEC considered "audiotapes" to be among
 the types of electronic media that could be used. Use of Electronic Media for Delivery
 Purposes, 60 SEC Docket 1091, 1092 n.9 (Oct. 6, 1995).
 91. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 101 (d).
 92. See id. § 101(d)(l)(A); accord UETA, supra note 5, § 12(a)(l) (subsection (a)(l) is slightly
 more specific, referring to information "set forth in the record after it was first generated in
 its final form as an electronic record or otherwise") Both statutes provide an exception to the
 requirement that copies remain accessible for transitory data created by information systems
 in the process of transmitting records from one location to another, as well as codes and other
 non-substantive data used solely "to enable the . . . record to be sent, communicated, or
 received." E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 101(d)(2); accord UETA, supra note 5, § 12(b).
 93. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 101(d)(l)(B); accord VETA, supra note 5, § 12(a)(2) (stating,
 merely, "remains accessible for later reference").
 94. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 101(d)(3); accord UETA, supra note 5, § 12(d).
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 retention requirement under other law.95 This provision was included in
 both E-SIGN and UETA because many state laws now contain require-
 ments that canceled checks be retained. Such requirements are based gen-
 erally on the assumption that payments will be made by check, and that
 financial audits can be facilitated by retaining those checks. Such require-
 ments, however, are now often anachronistic and inhibit the moderniza-
 tion of the check collection system, particularly through the use of check
 truncation systems that permit the conversion of a paper check to an elec-
 tronic form in order to speed presentment and return.
 The E-SIGN and UETA provisions only apply to checks in the context
 of records retention, not to their use as a payment device. Articles 3 and
 4 of the U.C.C., which govern the use of checks and other negotiable
 instruments, were excluded from the scope of both E-SIGN and UETA
 in part out of deference to concerns of bank regulators over the impact
 that the sudden recognition of electronic checks as a new payment device
 might have on the stability and security of U.S. payment systems.96
 Moreover, revising the law of negotiable instruments to accommodate elec-
 tronic checks would be a formidable task, more properly undertaken by
 NCCUSL, which has not yet chosen to take it on.97
 Subject to permitted regulatory restrictions, the E-SIGN records reten-
 tion provisions obviate the need for parties to produce paper copies of
 electronic records solely to comply with record keeping requirements, and
 they allow parties who have kept paper records to convert them to elec-
 tronic form. Moreover, information that is originally stored in one elec-
 tronic form, such as on the hard drive of a computer, can be transferred
 to another form, such as a CD-ROM, or converted to an updated file
 format to preserve accessibility. So long as the information contained in
 the record is reflected accurately, such modifications of the contract or
 record itself are permitted.
 95. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 101(d)(4); accord VETA, supra note 5, § 12(e).
 96. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 103(a)(3): accord UETA, supra note 5, § 3(b)(2). See Letter
 from Federal Reserve Bank of New York to UETA Drafting Committee, Feb. 1 , 1999, available
 at <http://www.uetaonline.com>.
 97. In 2000, NGCUSL established a drafting committee to make revisions to U.C.C.
 Articles 3, 4, and 4A. The focus of these revisions are Article 4 provisions governing the
 return of dishonored checks, and in an effort to complete that task as quickly as possible, the
 scope of the drafting committee's work is quite limited. The scope of this drafting committee's
 work expressly excludes electronic checks, which would quite likely be a controversial topic
 whose inclusion would delay the completion of the drafting committee's other tasks. Infor-
 mation about the scope of the drafting committee's charge is available from the U.C.C.
 Payments Articles Revisions web site at <http://www.uccpayments.org>. See Letter from
 John L. McClaugherty Defining Scope of NCCUSL Charge to Drafting Committee, Feb.
 10, 2000, available at <http://library.law.smu.edu/uccpayments/docs/mcclaughertyl.htm>;
 Memorandum from Professor Neil Cohen to Permanent Editorial Board of the U.C.C., Nov.
 18, 1999, available at <http://library.law.smu.edu/uccpayments/docs/cohenl 199.htm>.
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 Federal and state regulatory agencies, however, are expressly permitted
 to "interpret" E-SIGN's record retention provisions to "specify perfor-
 mance standards to assure accuracy, record integrity, and accessibility of
 records that are required to be retained."98 Moreover, while the Act gen-
 erally precludes agencies from using their interpretive authority either to
 require the use of paper or other non-electronic records," or to require
 the use of specific technologies or technical specifications for electronic
 records or signatures,100 agencies are allowed some discretion to require
 paper, specific technologies, or both, in connection with their records re-
 tention requirements.
 Federal and state agencies are permitted to use their interpretive au-
 thority under the Act101 to require retention of records in a "tangible
 printed or paper form," but only if "there is a compelling governmental
 interest relating to law enforcement or national security for imposing such
 a requirement," and if "imposing such requirement is essential to attaining
 such interest."102 As noted in the legislative history, these conditions to
 imposing paper record retention are clearly intended "to impose an ex-
 tremely high barrier before a federal or state regulatory agency will revert
 back to requiring paper records."103 More particularly, it was generally
 understood during the conference process that the reference to "law en-
 forcement" matters, especially as juxtaposed with reference to "national
 security" matters, was intended to refer only to criminal matters of high
 national interest, such as drug law enforcement, not to the enforcement of
 any and every law or regulation. It remains to be seen, however, how
 broadly agencies will be permitted to apply this authority. One indication
 that a broader reach may be permitted is legislative history noting that the
 SEC should be able to utilize this provision to continue to apply its rules
 requiring firms to obtain and retain manually signed paper records in
 connection with penny stocks and related accounts.104
 Agencies also may interpret the record retention provisions of the Act
 to establish performance standards that require the use of specific tech-
 nologies or technical specifications (but not to require the use of a partie -
 98. E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 104(b)(3)(A).
 99. See id. 8 104(c)(l).
 100. See id. § 104(b)(2)(C)(iii).
 101. See id. § 104(b); infra notes 207-21 and accompanying text.
 102. E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 104(b)(3)(B).
 103. 146 Cong.Rec. H4355 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement of Rep. Bliley); 146
 Cong. Rec. S5286 (daily ed. June 16, 2000) (statement of Sen. Abraham).
 104. 146 CONG. Rec. H4358 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement of Rep. Dingell). Cf.
 Securities Exchange Act Rules 1 5g-2 and 1 5g-9, 1 7 C.F.R. §§ 240. 1 5g.2, 240. 1 5g-9 (requiring
 broker-dealers to obtain certain manually signed, "written" documents from penny stock
 customers). Note, however, while E-SIGN § 104(b)(3)(B) contemplates that an agency may
 require retention of a paper record, it does not provide that an agency may require parties to
 obtain paper records or to require that those records be manually signed in order for them
 to be valid, effective, or legally enforceable.
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 ular type of hardware or software), provided that the agency finds that the
 requirement "serves an important governmental objective." This "impor-
 tant governmental objective" test obviously is not as stringent as the stan-
 dard imposed with respect to paper retention. The legislative history, how-
 ever, indicates that this provision still is "intended to be an extremely high
 barrier" that will be used "in only a very, very few instances" after "ex-
 haust [ing] all other avenues."105 Nevertheless, it is likely that some agencies
 that have already established performance standards for electronic record
 retention will be allowed to continue those standards by issuing appropriate
 interpretations under the Act.106
 In order to provide time for government agencies to prescribe electronic
 records retention performance standards, the effective date of E-SIGN with
 respect to records retention requirements is delayed beyond the October 1 ,
 2000 date that generally applies for the rest of the Act. The effective date
 of the Act's provisions with respect to records retention requirements is
 nominally set for March 1, 200 1.107 If, however, by March 1 a regulatory
 agency has initiated but has not completed a rulemaking proceeding to
 prescribe performance standards for a particular record retention require-
 ment, then the Act's effective date with respect to that requirement will
 be June 1, 200 1.108
 ELECTRONIC FILINGS
 There is no provision in E-SIGN that explicitly allows parties to make
 electronic filings with governmental agencies in connection with their
 transactions, and several provisions in the Act imply different answers to
 the question of whether electronic filings are affirmatively permitted or
 whether agencies are merely encouraged to accept them. The latter is
 likely to be the answer that will prevail.
 It is implicit in E-SIGN's base rule providing legal parity for electronic
 records that statutes and regulations may not deny the legal effect of filings
 with governmental agencies solely because they are made with an elec-
 tronic record. As noted previously, however, E-SIGN provides that parties
 105. 146 Cong. Rec. H4355 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement of Rep. Bliley); 146
 Cong. Rec. S5286 (daily ed. June 16, 2000) (statement of Sen. Abraham).
 106. Representative Dingell stated that the performance standards set forth in the SEC's
 Exchange Act Rule 17a-4(f) and Investment Company Act Rule 31a-2(f), "are essential to
 the SEC's investor protection mission and are consistent with the provisions of the [Act]."
 146 Cong. Rec. H4358 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
 107. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 107(b)(l)(A).
 108. See id. § 107(b)(l)(B). E-SIGN also has a June 1, 2001 delayed effective dates for
 transactions involving loans guaranteed or insured by the federal government or any agency
 thereof or involving certain other government programs. See id. § 107(b)(2). Also, records
 provided to consumers in connection with Sallie Mae-insured student loans will not be cov-
 ered until such time as the Secretary of Education publishes a notice required by other law
 or June 30, 2001, whichever is earlier. See id. § 107(b)(3).
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 are generally not required to use or accept electronic records or signa-
 tures.109 To the extent that governmental agencies are covered by this
 voluntariness standard, it follows that individual agencies would be free to
 determine, by regulation, that they will not accept electronic filings. Thus,
 there is at least a potential conflict between two key provisions of the Act
 insofar as they apply to electronic filings.
 E-SIGN highlights, rather than resolves, this conflict. First, section
 101 (b)(2) of the Act expressly excludes governmental agencies from the
 general rule that parties are not required to agree to use or accept elec-
 tronic records or signatures, except with respect to contracts to which the
 governmental agency is a party110 This strongly suggests that govern-
 mental agencies are required to accept electronic records for filing and
 other non-contractual purposes. That implicit requirement, however, is
 undercut by other provisions in the Act.
 E-SIGN section 104(a) allows any federal regulatory agency, federally
 supervised self-regulatory organization (SRO), or state111 regulatory
 agency to require that records filed with it be "in accordance with specified
 standards or formats." Standing alone, this authority to establish "stan-
 dards and formats" for filings can be easily reconciled with the exclusion
 of governmental agencies from the voluntariness rule of section 101(b)(2).
 It can be read to permit only the establishment (or continuance) of "stan-
 dards and formats" for electronic records, not requirements for paper.
 Indeed, that reading would seem to be the best way to reconcile the two
 provisions.
 Two other E-SIGN provisions, however, tilt the balance in favor of con-
 cluding that electronic filings may be precluded by regulatory "standards
 or formats" requirements. E-SIGN section 104(c)(2) cautions that federal
 regulatory agencies are not relieved of their "obligations under the Gov-
 ernment Paperwork Elimination Act,"1 12 which establishes maximum time
 frames for the acceptance of electronic filings by federal agencies.113 It
 does not seem that there would be any purpose in having this provision
 if the Act itself mandated federal agencies to accept electronic filings at
 this time. In addition, E-SIGN section 104(c)(l), which expressly precludes
 109. See id. § 101(b)(2).
 110. See id.
 111. The Act defines "state to include "the District of Columbia and the territories and
 possessions of the United States," but the definition does not expressly include cities, counties,
 and other subdivisions of a state. Id. § 106(12). Hence, the Act may not contain a comparable
 savings provision for local governmental agencies. If so, it may present difficulties for county
 recorders offices and similar local facilities that have not yet been able to convert their systems
 to accommodate electronic filings. Conversely, however, these offices also may not constitute
 "governmental agencies" within the meaning of E-SIGN section 101(b)(2), and thus there
 may be no ambiguity as to their ability to choose not to use or accept electronic records or
 signatures under E-SIGN's "voluntariness" rule. See id. § 10 l(b)(2).
 112. Id.§ 104(c)(2).
 i is. see 44 u.s.c § 35U4 (iyy4 & Supp. lv iyy»).
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 agencies from using their interpretive authority to impose or reimpose
 requirements that records be in paper form, does not apply to the agencies'
 authority under section 104(a) of the Act, which establishes "standards or
 formats" for filings.114 Both of these provisions were specifically cited in
 the legislative history as establishing that in setting "standards and for-
 mats," agencies "may decide in some cases not to adopt an electronic
 process at all for filings if they determine (consistent with the Government
 Paperwork Elimination Act), after careful consideration, that this alter-
 native is not practicable."115
 TRANSFERABLE RECORDS
 Title II of E-SIGN contains special provisions on "transferable records,"
 which are the electronic equivalent of negotiable instruments.116 The
 E-SIGN provisions are nearly identical to the transferable record provi-
 sions in UETA, 1 1 7 except that they are limited to promissory notes secured
 by real property. The transferable record provisions require that the issuer
 have expressly agreed that the instruments will be treated as transferable
 records. Accordingly, they do not authorize the conversion of existing pa-
 per promissory notes to electronic form.
 The transferable record provisions also set forth the technological and
 business process standards that must be met before an electronic version
 of a promissory note can be treated as equivalent to a paper promissory
 note. These require that the electronic promissory note be created, trans-
 ferred, and stored under highly secure conditions that are sufficient to
 "reliably establish" that only one person can control what is done with the
 electronic promissory note at any point in time. If the electronic promissory
 note exists under such highly secure conditions, then control over it is the
 functional equivalent of possession of a paper promissory note. A party
 that is in control of an electronic promissory note under section 20 1 of
 E-SIGN may be a holder in due course, just as a party in possession of a
 paper note may be.
 Very few computer systems in use today can meet the security standards
 set by the transferable record control requirements. Although a system
 that meets those standards is likely to rely on complex access controls and
 cryptography, it may also include business policies and procedures imple-
 1 14. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, §§ 104(a) and 104(c)(l).
 115. 146 Cong. Rec. E 107 1-72 (daily ed. June 21, 2000) (extension of remarks by Rep.
 Dingell). Other statements in the legislative history also indicate that section 104(a) should
 be read to allow agencies to require paper filings, although most add that "it is intended that
 use of such authority is rarely exercised." 146 Cong. Rec. H4354 (daily ed. June 14, 2000)
 (statement of Rep. Bliley); see also 146 CONG. Rec. S5286 (daily ed. June 16, 2000) (statement
 of Sen. Abraham).
 1 16. E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 201.
 117. See UETA, supra note 5, § 16. See R. David Whitaker, Rules under the Uniform Electronic
 Transactions Act for an Electronic Equivalent to a Negotiable Promissory Note, 55 Bus. Law. 437 (1999).
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 merited by humans as well. On the other hand, the use of encryption
 technologies such as digital signatures alone would not be sufficient to
 create a transferable record.118 Digital signatures can provide a guarantee
 of the authenticity of electronic signatures and the integrity of electronic
 records but, unless they are combined with access controls, cannot guar-
 antee that no one but the legal owner of an electronic promissory note
 can make changes to it or transfer it to a third person.
 Electronic promissory notes secured by real property were included in
 E-SIGN at the request of the mortgage industry and are intended to pro-
 mote greater use of electronic commerce technologies in the secondary
 mortgage market. The language describing control as the equivalent of
 possession first appeared in the revised U.C.C. Article 9 provisions dealing
 with electronic chattel paper,119 which was added to promote greater use
 of electronic commerce technologies in equipment financing markets. The
 electronic chattel paper provisions of Article 9 were then adapted for use
 in section 16 of UETA.120
 SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR ELECTRONIC AGENTS AND
 APPLICATION TO INSURANCE
 E-SIGN elaborates on its base rule specifically to accommodate the use
 of electronic agents in contract or records formation. It provides that a
 contract or other record relating to an interstate or foreign transaction
 may not be denied legal effect solely because its formation, creation, or
 delivery involved one or more electronic agents, provided that the action
 of the electronic agent is "legally attributable" to the person to be
 bound.121 Like UETA, E-SIGN defines the term "electronic agent" to
 cover automated means of initiating or responding to records or actions
 "without review or action by an individual."122 Unlike E-SIGN, however,
 the comparable provisions in UETA do not require an electronic agent's
 actions to be "legally attributable" to the person that would be bound,
 118. See Jane K. Winn, Couriers without Luggage: Negotiable Instruments and Digital Signatures,
 49 S.C. L. Rev. 739 (1998), available at <http://www.smu.edu/~jwinn/ecouriers.htm>; Wal-
 ter A. Effross, Notes on PKI and Digital Negotiability: Would the Cybercourier Carry Luggage?, 38
 JurimetricsJ. 385 (1998).
 1 19. See Revised U.C.C. § 9-105 (1998). See also Jane K. Winn, Electronic Chattel Paper under
 Revised Article 9: Updating the Concept of Embodied Rights for Electronic Commerce, 74 Chi. -Kent L.
 Rev. 1055, 1060-61 (1999), available at <http://www.smu.edu/~jwinn/winnecp.htm>.
 120. Unlike E-SIGN, section 16 of UETA applies to any promissory note and to docu-
 ments of title. See UETA, supra note 5, § 16(a)(l).
 121. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 101(h).
 122. Id. § 106(3); UETA, supra note 5, § 2(8). Note, however, that the E-SIGN definition
 refers to the absence of review or action by an individual "at the time of the action or
 response." E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 106(3). This phrase appeared in early drafts of UETA,
 but was deleted to avoid an implication that a later review or action by an individual might
 still be required.
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 providing instead that a contract may be formed from the interaction of
 electronic agents "even if no individual was aware of ... the electronic
 agents' actions or the resulting terms and agreements."123 This UETA
 language was intended to negate "any claim" that might arise from agency
 or contract law "that lack of human intent, at the time of contract for-
 mation, prevents contract formation" when electronic agents are in-
 volved.124 By requiring that the actions of electronic agents be "legally
 attributable" to the person to be bound, E-SIGN may not reach the same
 result.
 E-SIGN also contains two provisions addressing specific concerns of the
 insurance industry. First, in order to satisfy the specific reference require-
 ment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act,125 E-SIGN expressly provides that
 it applies to the business of insurance.126 The other provision insulates
 insurance agents and brokers from liability if problems arise with electronic
 procedures agreed to in a contract entered into by the broker under the
 directions of a party, provided that the agent or broker was not negligent,
 was not involved in the development or establishment of the electronic
 procedures, and complied with the procedures.127 The inclusion of this
 provision for the specific benefit of insurance agents and brokers should
 not be read to imply that other agents or brokers would be liable in like
 circumstances.
 SCOPE: RECORDS AND SIGNATURES RELATING
 TO TRANSACTIONS IN INTERSTATE AND
 FOREIGN COMMERCE
 APPLICATION TO TRANSACTIONS
 Subject to exceptions for specified laws and records,128 E-SIGN applies
 to electronic records and signatures "relating to" transactions in or af-
 fecting interstate or foreign commerce.129 This is substantially the same as
 under the UETA, which also applies to electronic records and signatures
 123. UETA, supra note 5, § 14(1).
 124. Id. § 14cmt. 1.
 125. McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. W, 5y Stat. 66 (iy45) (codihed as amended at IS U.S.CJ.
 §§ 1011-15(1994)).
 126. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 101(i).
 127. See id. § 101®.
 128. See id. § 103.
 129. See id. §§ 101 (a), (c), (d), (e), (g), and (h). The other provisions in Tide I of the Act
 modify or are based on the rules established under those sections. The scope of Title II of
 E-SIGN, which governs transferable records, however, is not explicidy limited either to
 "transactions" or to interstate or foreign commerce. As a practical matter, however, trans-
 ferable records would only be used in connection with a transaction and, since the primary
 usefulness of transferable records is to facilitate secondary mortgage market transactions,
 there are likely to be few transactions in which they are used that are not interstate in nature.
This content downloaded from 205.175.118.27 on Mon, 08 Jan 2018 18:36:13 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Electronic Records and Signatures 319
 "relating to a transaction,"130 except, of course, that UETA is limited to
 transactions governed by the relevant state's law, not to those in interstate
 or foreign commerce. E-SIGN defines the term "transaction" as:
 an action or set of actions relating to the conduct of business, con-
 sumer, or commercial affairs between two or more persons, including
 any of the following types of conduct-
 (A) the sale, lease, exchange, licensing, or other disposition of
 (i) personal property, including goods and intangibles, (ii) services,
 and (iii) any combination thereof; and
 (B) the sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of any interest in
 real property, or any combination thereof.131
 This definition is intended to be broadly construed and covers the full
 range of business, consumer, and commercial conduct,132 including, but
 not limited to, the types of conduct specifically described within the defi-
 nition, which are intended to be exemplary, not limiting.133 Thus, drafts
 of the definition that were circulated and discussed among congressional
 staff prior to the final conference report on the Act and that contained
 more lengthy itemizations of included conduct were rejected so as to avoid
 any inference that the description was a definitive listing or that omitted
 items were not included within the definition. Moreover, the types of con-
 duct described are themselves intended to be broadly construed and ap-
 plied. The legislative history of the Act emphasizes that the reference to
 "services" is not limited to any particular type of service, but rather it:
 130. UETA, supra note 5, § 3(a).
 131. E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 106(13).
 132. The E-SIGN definition specifically refers to "consumer" conduct so as to avoid any
 possible confusion as to whether business or commercial transactions involving consumers
 are covered. The definition of "transaction" in UETA does not explicitly refer to consumer
 conduct, UETA, supra note 5, § 2(16), but the Official Comments make clear that the term
 is to be "construed broadly to include commercial and business transactions involving indi-
 viduals who may qualify as 'consumers' under other applicable law." Id. § 2 cmt. 12.
 133. "The term 'including' is not one of all embracing definition, but connotes simply an
 illustrative application of the general principle." Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck
 Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 99 (1941); U.S. v. Gertz, 249 E2d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 1957) ("The
 word 'includes' is usually a term of enlargement, and not of limitation."); Agrosy Ltd. v.
 Hennigan, 404 E2d 14, 20 (5th Cir. 1968) ("the word 'including . . . conveys the conclusion
 that these are other items indudable, though not specifically enumerated by the statute.";
 American Federation of Television & Radio Artists v. N.L.R.B., 462 F.2d 887, 889 (D.C. Cir.
 1972) (statutory statement that "the term 'person' includes one or more individuals ... is a
 term of enlargement, not of limitation, and . . . the reference to certain entities or categories
 is not intended to exclude all others" (emphasis in original)); FTC v. MTK Marketing, Inc.,
 149 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 1998), cert, denied, 1 19 S. Ct. 1028 (1999) ("In terms of statutory
 construction, use of the word 'includes' does not connote limitation; in definitive provisions of
 statutes and other writing, 'include' is frequently, if not generally, used as a word of extension
 or enlargement rather than as one of limitation or enumeration.").
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 covers any activity that would qualify as a financial activity, an activity
 incidental to a financial activity, or a complementary activity, under
 section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act ... [as well as] all
 activities relating to employee benefit plans or any other type of tax-
 favored plan.134
 Similarly, a floor statement by one of the Act's primary sponsors indicated
 that the Act covers all "records, signatures and agreements governed by
 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . [or] used in financial planning,
 income tax preparation, and investments."135
 The full breadth of the scope of the Act, however, is established by its
 use of the phrase "relating to." While the definition of "transaction" refers
 to conduct "between two or more persons," the definition expressly covers
 any action "relating to" such conduct.136 Thus, for purposes of E-SIGN,
 a "transaction" includes any unilateral actions taken in connection with
 bi-lateral commercial conduct.137 Moreover, the expansive effect of this
 definition is multiplied by E-SIGN's operative provisions, which themselves
 specify that they apply to electronic records and signatures "relating to
 transactions."138 This makes clear that E-SIGN extends beyond actual
 transaction documents to include all ancillary records, such as applications,
 filings, notices, and similar documentation. For example, forms that are
 completed to open a customer account with a retail business, a bank, or
 a brokerage firm, as well as documents needed in order for an investor to
 open an individual retirement account (IRA) or 401(k) plan are related to
 the business, savings, or investment transactions that will occur under that
 account or plan and are within the coverage of the Act. 1 39
 One aspect of the E-SIGN definition of "transaction" and, therefore,
 of the scope of the Act, that is somewhat narrower than UETA is the
 coverage of "governmental" matters. UETA specifically includes "govern-
 134. 146 CONG. Rec. S5283 (daily ed. June 16, 2000) (colloquy between Sens. Gramm
 and Abraham).
 135. Id. (statement of Sen. Abraham).
 136. E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 106(13).
 137. [A] unilateral action or set of actions by one of the parties to the underlying trans-
 action, by any other person with any interest in the underlying transaction, or a
 response by one party to the other's action, all are covered by the [A]ct. In this
 regard, it is the nature of the activity, rather than the number of persons or the
 identity or status of the person or entity involved in the activity, that determines the
 applicability of the [A]ct.
 146 Cong. Rec. S5282 (daily ed. June 16, 2000) (colloquy between Sens. Gramm and
 Abraham).
 138. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, §§ 101 (a), (c), (d), (e), (g), and (h).
 139. Sirmlarly, the Ofhcial Comments to UETA emphasize that UETA "does apply to all
 electronic records and signatures related to a transaction, and so does cover, for example,
 internal auditing and accounting records related to a transaction." UETA, supra note 5, § 2
 cmt. 12 (emphasis in original).
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 mental affairs" within its definition of "transaction," and notes in its of-
 ficial comments that the definition covers "interactions between people for
 . . . governmental purposes."140 The reach ofthat reference could be con-
 siderable, extending the applicability of UETA's rules beyond commerce
 to purely governmental matters such as voting or the judicial, legislative,
 and executive processes of government.141 E-SIGN stops short of this,
 omitting any reference to "governmental affairs" in its definition of
 "transaction."142
 As noted in congressional floor statements on the Act, this language was
 omitted so that E-SIGN would not cover activities that are "part of a
 uniquely Governmental operation," such as voting or related private con-
 duct, including "collecting signatures to place a nomination on a ballot,
 . . . even though it might have some nexus with commerce (such as the
 signature collectors' contract of employment)."143 While such an incidental
 "nexus" between a record and commerce undoubtedly is insufficient to
 bring nominating petitions within the ambit of the Act, it does not follow
 that the existence of a nexus between a record and government prevents
 the record from being covered by the Act. Rather, the sole determinant of
 whether a record or signature is covered by the Act is whether that record
 or signature bears a sufficient relationship to the conduct of business, con-
 sumer, or commercial affairs. Thus, the signature collector's contract of
 employment, cited in the example above, is clearly a commercial contract
 covered by E-SIGN, even though the nominating petition is not.144
 140. Id. See also id. sections 17-19 legislative note regarding adoption of sections 17 to
 19, which observes that even if a state does not adopt those sections (which relate primarily
 to the creation of electronic records by government agencies and to intergovernmental uses),
 the balance of UETA "will still apply to governmental entities when acting as a 'person'
 engaging in 'transactions' within its scope."
 141. UETA directly affects the judicial process in at least one respect, specifying that
 "evidence of a record or signature may not be excluded solely because it is in electronic
 form." UETA, supra note 5, § 13. E-SIGN has no comparable provision.
 142. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 106(13).
 143. 146 CONG. Rec. H4357 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement of Rep. Dingell); 146
 GONG. Rec. S5229 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement of Sens. Hollings, Wyden, and
 Sarbanes).
 144. Perhaps the most immediate example of the kind of "uniquely governmental" activ-
 ity that would not be covered by E-SIGN was President Clinton's "signing" of the E-SIGN
 legislation by means of an electronic signature. In fact, the President manually signed the
 Act "the traditional way, with a felt-tip pen" and then re-signed it for ceremonial purposes,
 using a digital signature encoded on a smart card. Electronic Signatures Given Legal Standing, N. Y.
 TIMES, July 1, 2000, at C3. Thus, his electronic signature was not intended to be legally
 effective. And, of course, even if the Act had become effective immediately, rather than being
 deferred until October 1, E-SIGN could not have been invoked to validate the electronic
 signature used to make it law in the first place. Nevertheless, the signing of legislation un-
 doubtedly is within the realm of purely governmental affairs not falling within the definition
 of "transaction" or the scope of the Act.
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 The example of the nominating petition signature collector helps illus-
 trate a principle that is important to understanding E-SIGN's scope -
 namely, that an activity that is governmental from the perspective of one
 party, may be a commercial or business activity from the perspective of
 the other. Thus, the congressional floor statements referenced above ma-
 terially overstated the case when they went on to suggest that "most gov-
 ernmental transactions" are outside the Act's coverage.145 While those
 statements indicated that the issuance of government grants and applica-
 tions for government benefits are not c 'transactions" even though they may
 involve the issuance of a government check,146 it is evident that many such
 grants and applications will be business transactions for the applicant -
 for example, a scientist obtaining a research grant - and would be cov-
 ered.147 Other legislative history recognized this point, including a collo-
 quy involving the Act's principal Senate sponsor that noted that E-SIGN
 covered "all activities relating to employee benefit plans, . . . including all
 related tax and other required filings and reports."148
 SPECIFIC EXCEPTIONS
 E-SIGN section 103 provides that section 101 of the Act, which contains
 all of the Act's operative provisions (other than those relating to transfer-
 able records) on the use of electronic records and signatures, does not apply
 "to the extent" that a contract or record is governed by any of a list of
 specific laws or types of laws.149 The excepted laws are: laws governing
 adoption, divorce, or other matters of family law; most provisions of the
 U.C.C.;150 and laws governing the creation and execution of wills, codicils,
 145. See 146 Cong. Rec. H4357 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
 146. See id.
 147. Coverage of records having a governmental nexus is clear from the fact that govern-
 mental agencies are included within the E-SIGN definition of a "person" who may engage
 in a transaction, see E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 106(8), and from the fact that the Act specifically
 addresses the use and acceptance of electronic records and signatures by governmental agen-
 cies, see id. § 101(b)(2), and government procurement, see id. § 104(b)(4), and filings with reg-
 ulatory agencies, see id. § 104(a).
 148. 146 Cong. Rec. S5283 (daily ed. June 16, 2000) (colloquy between Sens. Gramm
 and Abraham). But cf. 146 Cong. Rec. E 1078 (daily ed. June 22, 2000) (extension of remarks
 by Rep. Markey) (taking issue with this statement, at least insofar as it refers to "all" such
 records).
 149. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 103(a); accord UETA, supra note 5, § 3(b).
 150. As under UETA, certain U.C.C, provisions are not excepted. These are U.C.C.
 sections 1-107 and 1-206 and Articles 2 and 2A, which contain broadly applicable writing
 or signature requirements, including the Statute of Frauds. The remaining U.C.C, provisions,
 which are excluded from the Act's coverage, have been revised in recent years with an eye
 toward the use of electronic records and signatures and generally retain only those writing
 and signature requirements that were considered necessary in order to preserve or protect
 third party rights or expectations.
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 or testamentary trusts. It should be emphasized that the only trusts affected
 by this exclusion are testamentary trusts - i.e., trusts that are created pur-
 suant to the terms of a will and that do not take effect until after the death
 of the person creating them. Trusts, such as those established in connection
 with a retirement plan or an IRA, are created during the life of the plan
 participant and thus are not excluded.
 Other than the exception for laws governing adoption, divorce, or other
 matters of family law, the laws excepted under E-SIGN are also excepted
 under the UETA.151 Unlike UETA, however, E-SIGN contains no excep-
 tion for the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA).152
 Thus, to the extent that UCITA contains a rule relating to electronic
 signatures or records that is inconsistent with E-SIGN, that rule would not
 be applied to a record relating to a transaction affecting interstate or for-
 eign commerce.
 While E-SIGN does not validate the use of electronic records or sig-
 natures to satisfy writing and signature requirements that are imposed
 under the excepted laws, other records used in the same transaction may
 be covered by the Act. Similarly, since E-SIGN only excludes records "to
 the extent" that they are governed by the specified laws, the use of an
 electronic record may be valid for purposes of a non-excluded law even if
 E-SIGN does not validate it for purposes of an excluded law. This is the
 same substantive rule as applies to exclusions under UETA.153
 In addition, section 103(b) of the Act excepts certain types of records.
 These include court notices and pleadings, notices terminating utility ser-
 vices or health or life insurance benefits, default notices under mortgage
 loans on or leases of a primary residence, and product recall notices, as
 well as documents required to accompany the transport of hazardous
 materials.
 E-SIGN provides for ongoing review of all of these exceptions. By
 June 30, 2003, the Commerce Department is required to report on
 whether the exemptions are necessary to protect consumers.154 In addi-
 tion, any federal agency may, after providing an opportunity for public
 comment, eliminate an exception with respect to matters within its juris-
 diction if the agency finds that the exception is no longer necessary for the
 protection of consumers and that its elimination presents no material risk
 of harm.155
 151. See UETA, supra note 5, § 3(b).
 152. See id. § 3(b)(3).
 153. UETA, however, makes this point explicitly, supplementing the "to the extent" lan-
 guage in section 3(b) with a provision stating that UETA applies to an electronic record or
 signature that is "otherwise excluded from the application of [UETA] under subsection (b)
 to the extent it is governed by a law other than those specified in subsection (b)." Id. § 3(c).
 154. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, S 103(c)(l).
 155. See id. § 103(c)(2).
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 LIMITED PREEMPTION: THE ABILITY OF STATES TO
 SUPERSEDE E-SIGN RULES
 GENERAL
 E-SIGN section 102 gives states limited authority to "modify, limit or
 supersede" the provisions of section 101 of the Act with respect to state
 law.156 States may exercise this authority, however, only by adopting:
 • the official version of UETA, without any state-specific variations
 and exclusive of individual state exceptions;157 or
 • another law that specifies "alternative procedures or requirements
 for the use or acceptance"158 of electronic records or signatures,
 provided that those alternative procedures or requirements: (1) are
 "consistent" with the substantive provisions of the Act;159 and
 (2) neither require nor accord preferred status to the use of a specific
 technology or technical specification for electronic records or sig-
 natures.160
 Superseding state laws may include laws adopted either before or after
 the enactment of E-SIGN, but superseding state laws (other than UETA)
 that are adopted after June 30, 2000, must make specific reference to
 E-SIGN.161
 E-SIGN thus contains an unusual form of limited, express preemption
 of state law.162 Instead of providing, as is more common, that the Act
 preempts "inconsistent" state laws163 or simply allowing the preemption
 156. See id. § 102(a).
 157. See id. § 102(a)(l). The official version of the UETA contemplates that a state may
 insert in § 3(b)(4) a list of any existing state laws that the state wants to exclude from UETA's
 coverage. Section 102(a)(l) of E-SIGN specifies that any laws that are so excepted from
 UETA will need to satisfy the E-SIGN requirements for other superseding state laws under
 E-SIGN. Id. § 102(a)(l).
 158. Id. § 102(a)(2)(A).
 159. See id. S 102(a)(2)(A)(i).
 160. See id. § 102(a)(2)(A)(ii).
 161. See id. § 102(a)(2)(B).
 1 62. "Express preemption occurs where Congress has considered the issue of preemption,
 has included in the legislation under consideration a provision expressly addressing that issue,
 and has explicitly provided therein that state law is preempted." Washington Mutual Bank,
 FA v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 89 Cal. Rep. 2d 560, 567 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
 Preemption of state law by a federal statute "may be either express or implied, and is 'com-
 pelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly
 contained in its structure and purpose.'" Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth of
 Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 738 (1985) (citations omitted).
 163. See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, § 507(a)
 (1999) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6807(a)) (noting that the privacy provisions of Title V
 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act "shall not be construed as superseding, altering, or affecting
 any statute, regulation, order, or interpretation in effect in any State, except to the extent
 that such statute, regulation, order, or interpretation is inconsistent with the provisions of this
 subtitle, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency."); Real Estate Settlement Procedures
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 of inconsistent state laws to be an implicit result of the supremacy clause
 of the Constitution,164 E-SIGN approaches the subject from the opposite
 direction, setting forth the limited circumstances in which state laws will
 not be preempted. This is necessitated by the fact that, while E-SIGN
 clearly does not preempt the field, thereby precluding states from legislat-
 ing in the area of electronic records and signatures,165 it also does not limit
 its preemption to those state laws that are "inconsistent" with the Act.
 Instead, E-SIGN section 102(a)(l) explicitly does not preempt the 1999
 official version of UETA (official UETA), irrespective of any inconsistency
 between that uniform statute and the Act, while E-SIGN section 102(a)(2)
 requires all other laws to comply with two standards: consistency with
 E-SIGN and technical neutrality.
 The genesis of these highly unusual provisions was a conflict in con-
 gressional objectives. On the one hand, Congress wanted to create a uni-
 form national law that would minimize obstacles to electronic com-
 merce;166 on the other, it wanted to limit the extent to which it would
 preempt state law and, perhaps secondarily, to encourage state adoption
 of the official version of UETA.167 Consequently, E-SIGN allows states to
 "modify, limit or supersede" the primary provisions of the Act through the
 enactment of official UETA. Since the text of official UETA was a known
 quantity, Congress could be comfortable that its adoption would not un-
 dermine E-SIGN's central purposes or rules. Moreover, if all states were
 to adopt the official version of UETA, there would still be a uniform,
 national rule that, while different from E-SIGN in various respects, would
 have substantially similar core provisions. Taken together, these factors
 made the prospect of a state superseding E-SIGN's provisions through the
 official version of the UETA acceptable to Congress.
 Act of 1974 (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 2616 (1994) (stating that RESPA "does not annul, alter
 or affect . . . the laws of any State with respect to settlement practices, except to the extent
 that those laws are inconsistent with any provision of [RESPA] , and then only to the extent
 of the inconsistency."); Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. § 3003(d) ("This
 chapter shall preempt State law to the extent such law is inconsistent with a provision of this
 chapter.").
 164. U.S. CONST, art. VI, cl. 2. "[S]ince our decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, it has been
 settled that state law that conflicts with federal law is 'without effect.'" Cipollone v. Liggett
 Group Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992), «7m£ Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)
 (citations omitted).
 165. "In the absence of an express congressional command, state law is pre-empted if
 that law actually conflicts with federal law or if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative
 field 'as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to sup-
 plement it.'" Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (1992).
 166. See 146 Cong. Rec. S5224 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement of Sen. Abraham)
 ("[T]he central purpose of this legislation is to establish a nation-wide baseline for the legal
 certainty of electronic signatures and records.").
 167. See id. ("I believe that the eventual adoption of UETA by all 50 states in a manner
 consistent with the version reported by NCCUSL will provide the same national uniformity
 which is established in the Federal legislation.").
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 Congress could not know, however, whether other state laws, including
 variations on official UETA, would conform with E-SIGN's requirements
 or result in any level of uniformity. Accordingly, the second part of the
 E-SIGN preemption provision, which applies to any state law other than
 official UETA,168 is expressly limited by a consistency standard that effec-
 tively precludes changes to any of E-SIGN's rules. E-SIGN also requires
 that state laws be technologically neutral.169 A state law that mandates the
 use of a particular technology is not preempted, however, to the extent
 that it governs procurement systems set up by any state or state agency.170
 The effect of any superseding state law will be limited to requirements
 imposed under state, not federal, law.171 Even in a state that adopts official
 UETA, the ability of a party to satisfy federal writing or signature require-
 ments with respect to a transaction in that state will be governed by
 E-SIGN, not by state law. Nevertheless, the ability of states to "modify,
 limit or supersede" E-SIGN's provisions creates some potential for non-
 uniformity. Moreover, even apart from considerations of non-uniformity,
 the limited preemption provisions in E-SIGN section 102 give rise to sig-
 nificant questions of interpretation, particularly as to the interface between
 the provisions of UETA and E-SIGN and the meaning and application of
 the "consistency" and "technical neutrality" standards.
 THE CONSISTENCY STANDARD AND APPLICATIONS
 TO UETA
 The Paradox of Superseding Without Being "Inconsistent"
 The semantics of the consistency standard in E-SIGN section
 102(a)(2)(A)(i) are confusing since they present the seeming paradox of a
 state law that may "modify, limit or supersede" E-SIGN only if it is "con-
 sistent" with it. This apparent conflict is resolved, however, by understand-
 ing that E-SIGN does not preempt the field; it governs what it addresses,
 and (except with respect to official UETA) it preempts state law with re-
 spect to those matters, but no more. Thus, properly read, the consistency
 standard prevents any state law (other than official UETA) from either
 adding to or subtracting from the requirements that E-SIGN imposes. For
 example, a state could not provide that only certain types of electronic
 168. The Act specifies that the rules applying to such other laws also apply to laws that
 are excepted pursuant to UETA, supra note 5, § 3(b)(4), even though such exceptions could
 be viewed as part of the official version of UETA. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 102(a)(l).
 169. See id. § 102(a)(2)(A)(ii). Again, official UETA did not pose this problem, since it is
 technologically neutral. The technical neutrality requirement does result in the preemption
 of digital signature laws, such as Utah's and those modeled after it. States that developed
 legislation that neither follows UETA nor the digital signature model may now face very
 complex questions regarding the degree to which those laws are preempted.
 170. See id. § 102(b).
 171. See id. § 102(a).
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 records may be considered legally effective or used to satisfy a writing
 requirement because to do so would be inconsistent with E-SIGN's base
 validity rule.172
 Similarly, a state may not adopt its own, non-conforming consumer
 consent requirements. E-SIGN section 101(c)(l) provides that the use of
 an electronic record in compliance with the conditions set forth in that
 subsection "satisfies the requirement" that the information contained in
 the record be provided to a consumer in writing. Hence, it is plain that a
 state law that imposed still more conditions on satisfying that requirement
 would be inconsistent with section 101(c)(l) and, therefore, would be pre-
 empted. For the same reason, a state law (other than official UETA) that
 imposed fewer or merely different conditions would also be preempted.
 Effect of Section 102 (a) in States Adopting Official UETA
 With respect to matters that are governed by state law, all of the pro-
 visions of UETA will be given effect in a state that adopts UETA in its
 unamended, official form, irrespective of whether those provisions can be
 viewed as "inconsistent" with E-SIGN.173 While UETA would not dis-
 place, with respect to state law, a provision in E-SIGN section 101 that is
 not modified, limited, or superseded by a provision of UETA, 1 74 virtually
 all the provisions within E-SIGN section 101 are taken from, or address,
 matters that are directly addressed by UETA175 and, thus, would be
 superseded.
 This may create numerous differences in application, due to small dif-
 ferences in substantively similar provisions. For example, both E-SIGN and
 UETA allow parties to satisfy record retention requirements using elec-
 tronic records that comply with stated accuracy and accessibility require-
 172. Moreover, under E-SIGN's technical neutrality provisions, a state law could not
 provide for a presumption of authenticity or give other legal advantages to electronic records
 or signatures based on the fact that they result from use of a particular technology. This is
 likely to prevent special legal status being accorded, for example, to PKI or other specific
 types of security systems. Nothing in E-SIGN, however, prevents private parties from using
 or requiring that their counterparties use such technologies, based on their own views that
 they are useful.
 173. The fact that E-SIGN provides that a state "may" modify, limit, or supersede
 E-SIGN by adopting UETA does not mean that a state has the option to adopt official
 UETA but decide separately whether it wants some or all of the UETA provisions to super-
 sede related provisions in E-SIGN. E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 102(a). The state's choice lies in
 adopting or not adopting (or in the case of pre-existing laws, choosing whether to repeal or
 amend) provisions of law that by their nature "modify, limit, or supersede." Id. A conclusion
 to the contrary would lead to enormous confusion.
 1 74. Unlike the version of S. 76 1 that was adopted by the Senate in November, E-SIGN
 does not provide that it "does not apply" in states that adopt UETA. See S. 761, 106th Cong.
 §5(0(1999).
 175. The only exception appears to be E-SIGN section § 101(j), which protects insurance
 agents and brokers from certain liabilities. E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 101(j).
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 ments.176 While those requirements are quite similar, they do not match.
 UETA, but not E-SIGN, specifies that the electronic record must accu-
 rately reflect the information "after it was first generated in its final form
 as an electronic record or otherwise."177 Conversely, while UETA merely
 states that the electronic record must "[remain] accessible for later refer-
 ence,"178 E-SIGN requires that the records remain accessible "to all per-
 sons who are entitled to access ... for the period required by [other law]
 ... in a form that is capable of being accurately reproduced for later
 reference ... ,"179 As a practical matter, these differences may not be
 material. Nevertheless, in a state that adopts the official version of UETA,
 the UETA standard will be applied with respect to state law retention
 requirements.
 The most visible difference between UETA and E-SIGN, and the one
 most likely to generate controversy, is the consumer consent provisions in
 E-SIGN's section 101(c). As discussed above, the Act provides that a con-
 sent conforming with its requirements must be obtained in order to satisfy
 the writing requirement inherent in any law requiring that information be
 provided or made available to consumers in writing. UETA, in contrast,
 provides that, if a law requires information to be provided, sent, or deliv-
 ered in writing to any person (whether or not that person is a consumer),
 that requirement "is satisfied if the information is provided, sent, or deliv-
 ered, as the case may be, in an electronic record capable of retention by
 the recipient at the time of receipt."180
 Both E-SIGN and UETA expressly allow parties to provide electronic
 records to satisfy writing requirements imposed in connection with the
 provision of information to consumers (and in the case of UETA, any
 other person). Since the UETA provision does so without requiring the
 type of affirmative consent and related disclosure required by E-SIGN,181
 that provision clearly modifies or supersedes the E-SIGN provision. As a
 result, in states that adopt the official version of UETA, the E-SIGN con-
 sumer consent would not be required with respect to information that state
 law requires be provided.182
 1 76. See id. § 101(d)(l); UETA, supra note 5, § 12(a). See also supra notes 91-108 and accom-
 panying text.
 177. UETA, supra note 5, § 12(a)(l).
 178. Id. § 12(a)(2).
 179. E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 101(d)(l)(B).
 180. UETA, supra note 5, § 8(a). UETA adds that an electronic record is not capable of
 retention by the recipient if the sender inhibits the ability of the recipient to print or store
 the electronic record. See id.
 181. UETA does condition this provision on the parties to the related transaction having
 "agreed to conduct a transaction by electronic means." Id. As discussed in the text, see supra
 notes 28-40 and accompanying text, however, that agreement need not be in any particular
 form and may be inferred "from the context and surrounding circumstances, including the
 parties' conduct." Id. § 5(b).
 182. Conversely, section 8(a) will not supersede the E-SIGN consumer consent provisions
 unless the state enacts official UETA. See infra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
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 This conclusion is contrary to the conclusion suggested by a statement
 in the legislative history to the effect that the "general" provisions of
 UETA, such as the requirement that parties agree to use or accept elec-
 tronic records, are "not inconsistent with and do not displace the more
 specific" consumer consent requirements of the Act.183 That statement,
 however, ignores the specific provision on the electronic provision of in-
 formation in UETA section 8(a). Moreover, other E-SIGN legislative his-
 tory (notably a statement by another of the primary supporters of the
 consumer consent provisions) appears to recognize that the official version
 of UETA would displace the consumer consent provision and suggests, as
 a solution, that states may want to adopt the E-SIGN consent provision
 as part of a non-conforming version of UETA.184
 The practical effect of even this prominent difference between E-SIGN
 and UETA, however, may be small. Compliance with the E-SIGN con-
 sumer consent provisions may prove both difficult and expensive, but a
 business that serves national markets is unlikely to find it productive to
 comply with it only in those states that have not enacted official UETA.
 Once the costs of developing the necessary systems have been expended,
 the incremental costs of deploying them in individual transactions are
 likely to be small. Conversely, the operational costs and risks of attempting
 to apply them only in the "right" locales - and to do so with respect to
 federal requirements in all jurisdictions - are likely to be high. Moreover,
 prospective customers may form a negative view of businesses that provide
 them with fewer protections in some jurisdictions than in others. The
 E-SIGN consumer consent provisions may influence the way courts eval-
 uate consumer electronic contract disputes even in jurisdictions where
 those requirements are superseded by the more general requirements of
 UETA.
 Applying the Consistency Standard in States Adopting
 Non-Conforming Versions of UETA
 The effect of differences between UETA and E-SIGN will be different
 in states that adopt non-conforming versions of UETA, i.e., versions that
 contain any amendments to or variations from the official version.185 In
 such cases - and nearly all of the states that have adopted UETA to date
 fall into this category - a key question of interpretation will be whether
 the consistency standard should be applied to the entirety of the non-
 conforming version of UETA or, rather, applied only to the non-conform-
 ing provisions. Under the latter interpretation, any provision taken from
 183. 146 Cong. Rec. S5230 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement of Sens. Hollings, Wy-
 den, and Sarbanes).
 184. 146 Cong. Rec. S5221-22 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
 loo. Presumably non-substantive changes, such as tormattmg, section numbering and the
 like, would not be enough to cause a state's version of UETA not to be considered the
 "official" version for purposes of E-SIGN section 102(a)(l).
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 the official version of UETA would be allowed to supersede an inconsistent
 provision of E-SIGN. Under the former, any provision in a non-conform-
 ing version of UETA, even those that are identical with provisions in the
 official version, would be subject to the consistency (as well as the technical
 neutrality) standard.
 Applying the consistency test on a provision-by-provision basis has some
 appeal when a state adopts nearly all of the official UETA provisions,
 making only small substantive changes or adding only a few, discrete pro-
 visions. Under such circumstances, allowing the official UETA provisions
 that are adopted by the state to supersede E-SIGN would maximize the
 extent to which UETA provisions would be applied and, thus, may seem
 consistent with an implicit congressional deference to official UETA. Fur-
 ther, in the view of a leading commentator, given the willingness of Con-
 gress to accept the provisions in official UETA, "it seems inappropriate to
 require judicial review of identical provisions [just] because a [s]tate leg-
 islature has chosen to include some non-uniform language."186
 The logic ofthat approach is less convincing, however, when it is applied
 to large scale variations on the official version of UETA. At its extreme,
 that interpretation would allow a state to "cherry-pick" those official
 UETA provisions that they prefer to E-SIGN, without regard to consis-
 tency or national uniformity. Such a result would be incongruent with the
 purposes of the Act. More importantly, it is at odds with the literal language
 of E-SIGN section 102(a), which applies the consistency standard to any
 state law that is not "an enactment or adoption of" official UETA, rather
 than to any law that is not a provision not contained within official UETA.
 Thus, statements in the legislative history of the Act emphasize that any
 state seeking to be covered by E-SIGN section 102(a)(i) is
 required to enact or adopt UETA without amendment. Any variation
 or derivation [sic] from the exact UETA document reported and
 recommended for enactment by NCCUSL shall not qualify under
 subsection [(a)](l) . . . [and] may or may not be eligible [i.e., permit-
 ted] under subsection [(a)] (2). . . . Thus, a State that enacted a mod-
 ified version of UETA would not be preempted to the extent that the
 enactment or adoption . . . met the conditions imposed in subsection
 (a)(2).i87
 Accordingly, the proper reading of E-SIGN section 102(a) is that the con-
 sistency standard should be applied to the entirety of the non-conforming
 186. Patricia Fry, A Preliminary Analysis of Federal and State Electronic Commerce Laws, Memo
 dated July 10, 2000, available at <http://www.uetaonline.com>.
 187. 146 CONG. Rec. H4353 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement of Rep. Bliley) (emphasis
 added). See also 146 Cong. Rec. S5285 (daily ed. June 16, 2000) (statement of Sen. Abraham)
 ("It is intended that any State that enacts or adopts UETA ... to remove itself from Federal
 preemption pursuant to subsection (a)(l) shall be required to enact or adopt UETA as that
 document was reported and recommended for enactment by NCCUSL.").
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 version of UETA, not on a provision-by-provision basis, and that provi-
 sions of official UETA may supersede E-SIGN only if they are contained
 in a fully compliant version of UETA.188
 Identifying "Consistent" UETA Provisions
 Provisions from official UETA that are included in non-conforming
 versions of UETA, and therefore at least under the second interpretation
 set forth above, subject to the E-SIGN consistency standard, may be con-
 sistent with E-SIGN in either of two ways: they impose the same substan-
 tive rule as E-SIGN, or they cover a subject area that is simply not ad-
 dressed by E-SIGN. An example of the first is the base validity rule, which
 is substantively the same under both UETA section 7 and E-SIGN section
 101 (a). No differing conditions or criteria are attached to this base rule
 under either statute, and so neither can fairly be said to be inconsistent
 with the other.
 There are many examples of the second type of consistency between
 UETA' s provisions and those of E-SIGN, and those provisions should
 establish a strong incentive for states to adopt UETA despite the adoption
 of E-SIGN. UETA addresses the attribution of electronic records, an im-
 portant issue when one party to a dispute has relied on an electronically
 signed record but the apparent signer of the record disavows it.189 UETA
 provides that in order for a party to be liable based on an electronically
 signed writing, the other party must be able to prove that the electronic
 signature was in fact the act ofthat person. This puts a substantial burden
 on the person who relied on the electronic signature, but is the same
 burden of proof that would be applied in a dispute involving a manual
 signature.190 UETA also provides default rules for determining when and
 where messages are sent and received.191 These rules will be helpful, for
 example, in determining when and where an offer to form a contract was
 accepted, which under applicable conflict of laws rules may determine
 which jurisdiction's law applies to a transaction. UETA includes a rule
 clarifying responsibility in some cases of erroneous or altered electronic
 communications.192 While E-SIGN clearly provides that an electronic doc-
 ument may be an "original" document for evidentiary or other purposes,
 it does not have a general provision similar to UETA section 13 which
 188. Accord Raymond T. Nimmer, Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of
 2000: Effect on State Laws (discussion draft, Aug. 11, 2000), available at <http://www.bmck.
 com/ecommerce/whatsnewesignatures.htm>.
 189. See UETA, supra note 5, § 9.
 1 90. The burden of proof in signature disputes under negotiable instruments law, how-
 ever, varies from the general rule of contract law. &?é?jANE K. WlNN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT,
 The Law of Electronic Commerce § 5.03 [B] (4th ed. 2001 forthcoming), available at
 <http://www.smu.edu/~jwinn/LawEcomm4thed.htm>.
 191. See UETA, supra note 5, § 15.
 192. See id. § 10.
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 states that electronic records may not be denied admissibility merely be-
 cause they are in electronic form.
 Other matters, however, notably the requirements for using electronic
 records to satisfy requirements to provide written information to consum-
 ers, are treated directly in different ways under E-SIGN and UETA. If the
 E-SIGN consistency standard is applied to all provisions in a non-con-
 forming version of UETA, the E-SIGN consumer consent requirements
 would apply in a state in which such a non-conforming version is adopted.
 The Prohibition on Circumventing E-SIGN Through UETA
 Section 8(b)(2)
 An important inconsistency between UETA and E-SIGN is the treat-
 ment of requirements under other law that records be sent by a specified
 method, such as by first class mail. UETA section 8(b)(2) qualifies the more
 general rule specifying that electronic records can be used to satisfy re-
 quirements to provide information in writing by adding that, if other law
 requires the record to be sent by a specified method, that method must
 be used.193 Thus, even an electronic record would need to be mailed, as,
 for example, by mailing a CD-ROM containing the electronic record.
 E-SIGN contains no such requirement, and it is implicit in the base validity
 rule, as well as in other provisions of the Act,194 that compliance with a
 mailing or similar requirement would not be required. Thus, in states
 that adopt a non-conforming version of UETA (or that do not adopt
 UETA at all), state mailing requirements would be overridden as "incon-
 sistent."195
 At least in states that adopt the official version of UETA, however,
 UETA section 8(b)(2) would supersede the inconsistent provisions of
 E-SIGN and thus would require compliance with mailing and similar re-
 193. See id. § 8(b)(2). UETA contains similar provisions with respect to posting, display,
 and formatting requirements, but for all practical purposes the E-SIGN rule is substantively
 the same. Cf., UETA, supra note 5, §§ 8(b)(l) and (3) and E-SIGN, supra note 1, §§ 101(b)(l)
 and 101(f). Thus, while these provisions are inconsistent, and the preemption provisions of
 E-SIGN at § 102(a)(2) would need to be applied accordingly, the practical significance of
 these inconsistencies is likely to be negligible.
 1 94. In the context of information to be provided to consumers, E-SIGN section 1 0 1 (c)
 makes clear that electronic records can be used to provide required information if the re-
 quired consumer consent is obtained, but unlike UETA, it does not limit that ability by
 requiring compliance with mailing or similar requirements. Similarly, section 101(c)(2)(B)
 requires compliance with verification and acknowledgment requirements imposed under laws
 in effect on June 30, 2000, but allows for electronic verifications and acknowledgments and
 does not extend any such compliance requirement to subsequent laws or to laws imposing
 other, similar requirements, such as methods of delivery.
 195. But cf. the view of Sen. Leahy, who suggests that E-SIGN "provides few answers" to
 the question of "[w] hat happens to State law requirements that a notice be sent by first class
 mail or personal delivery." 146 Gong. Rec. S5222 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement of
 Sen. Leahy).
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 quirements that exist under other state law.196 E-SIGN limits the potential
 effect of this inconsistency by providing that a state may not "circumvent"
 the Act by imposing non-electronic delivery requirements under UETA
 section 8(b)(2).197 Thus, states may not convert this provision into a loop-
 hole that allows them to replace existing requirements for "written" re-
 cords with new mailing or physical delivery requirements that would make
 the use of electronic records impracticable. Implicit in this provision is that
 states that have not adopted official UETA also may not use laws requiring
 a particular method of physical delivery to preclude the use of electronic
 delivery methods.198
 THE TECHNICAL NEUTRALITY STANDARD
 The second standard that must be satisfied by any superseding state law
 is that it must be technologically neutral. E-SIGN section 102(a)(2)(A)(ii)
 specifies that to avoid the preemptive effect of the Act, a state law must
 neither "require" nor "accord greater legal status or effect to, the imple-
 mentation or application of a specific technology or technical specification
 for performing the functions of creating, storing, generating, receiving,
 communicating, or authenticating electronic records or electronic signa-
 tures."199 If this provision were limited to laws that "require" the use of
 196. Since UETA could not affect requirements under federal law and since E-SIGN
 section 102 explicitly provides that states may supersede E-SIGN only "with respect to State
 law," compliance with federal mailing and similar requirements would not be required. See
 E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 102.
 197. See id. § 102(c).
 198. Oddly, Senator Leahy has suggested that E-SIGN's specific injunction against states
 using UETA section 8(b)(2) to circumvent E-SIGN has no negative implication for the validity
 of mailing or physical delivery requirements in states where official UETA does not supersede
 E-SIGN to validate at least existing laws imposing such requirements. To the contrary, he
 has argued:
 Because our bill is silent on this question, and because repeal and preemption by im-
 plication are disfavored, a court or agency interpreting the legislation could reasonably
 conclude that these Federal and State delivery requirements remain in full force and
 effect. Indeed, this interpretation is practically compelled by the plain language of the
 legislative text.
 146 CONG. Rec. S5222 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy). This argument
 appears at least overstated because by reason of sections 101 (c)( 1 ) and (2)(b), as well as by
 section 102(c), E-SIGN is by no means silent about the conditions imposed on using electronic
 means to provide information or about the ability of states to limit that use. Moreover, as
 the Senator went on to recognize, such an argument "does, however, have the potential to
 undermine one of our key legislative objectives - that is, the elimination of unintended and
 unwarranted barriers to electronic commerce." Id. Nevertheless, Senator Leahy sought to
 "assure the courts and regulators" that at least he had no "plan to permit electronic delivery
 of information . . . even when the law specifies a particular method by which delivery must
 be made." Id.
 199. E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 102(a)(2)(A)(ii).
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 particular technologies, it could fairly be seen as merely an elaboration of
 the consistency standard - i.e., since E-SIGN's base rule precludes denying
 legal effect to any "electronic record" or "electronic signature" (in each
 case, broadly defined) on the basis of its being electronic, it would be
 "inconsistent" for a state law to deny such legal effect unless the electronic
 record or signature uses a particular technology. The section 102(a)(2)(A)(ii)
 standard goes further, however, preempting any state law that would "ac-
 cord greater legal status or effect to" such a technology.
 Questions remain, however, as to how far this provision does go, par-
 ticularly with respect to the use of authentication technologies - sometimes
 referred to as security procedures - designed to verify the identity of the
 sender of an electronic record or to ensure that the content of an electronic
 record has not been altered. The legislative history reflects that this pro-
 vision was "intended to prevent a state from giving a leg up or imposing]
 an additional burden on one technology or technical specification that is
 not applicable to all others . . . ."20° The same statement in the legislative
 history, however, is careful to point out that the provision is not intended
 "to prevent a state . . . from developing, establishing, using or certifying a
 certificate authority system."201 Since E-SIGN section 102(a)(2)(A)(ii) spe-
 cifically alludes to the use of technical specifications for authenticating
 electronic records, it seems clear that the distinction alluded to in this
 statement is not between establishing certificate authority systems and
 other uses, but rather between laws that mandate or prefer a particular
 technology and those that do not.202
 Accordingly, so-called "digital signature" laws, such as the Utah Digital
 Signature Act,203 that assign legal significance only to the use of one par-
 ticular electronic signature technology - in Utah's case, "asymmetric cryp-
 tosystems" using public and private keys204 - seemingly would not satisfy
 the technical neutrality standard and thus would be preempted. Laws that
 200. 146 Cong. Rec. S5285 (daily ed. June 16, 2000) (statement of Sen. Abraham).
 201. Id.
 202. One commentator has suggested that, since E-SIGN section 101 does not address
 giving preferential treatment to particular technologies, a law that merely "gives enhanced
 effect to any particular technology" is unaffected by the technology neutral standard. See
 Raymond T. Nimmer, Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000: Effect
 on State Laws (discussion draft, Aug. 11, 2000), available at <http://www.bmck.com/
 ecommerce /whatsnewesignatures.htm>. Based on this, Professor Nimmer argues that a stat-
 ute providing that "signatures that use XYZ technology and certification procedures establish
 a presumption that they are the records or signatures of the person identified by the tech-
 nology" would not be preempted because E-SIGN section 101 does not deal with attribution
 issues. Id. This argument goes too far, however, effectively reading the words "accord greater
 legal status or effect to" out of the Act.
 203. Utah Code Ann. § 46-3-101 to 46-3-501 (1998).
 204. Section 46-3-103(10) of the Utah Code Annotated defines a "digital signature" as
 a transformation of a message using an asymmetric cryptosystem such that a person
 having the initial message and the signer's public key can accurately determine whether:
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 promote the use of digital signature technology, but are less "technology
 specific," however, may not be preempted. The Illinois Electronic Com-
 merce Security Act,205 for example, provides on the one hand that elec-
 tronic signatures and records generally cannot be denied legal effect merely
 because they are in electronic form, and on the other, that highly secure
 forms of electronic signature will be given preferred legal status.206 To the
 (a) the transformation was created using the private key that corresponds to the signer's
 public key; and (b) the message has been altered since the transformation was made.
 Utah Code Ann. § 46-3-103(10) (1998).
 Utah Code section 46-3-103(2) provides: "Asymmetric cryptosystem means an algorithm
 or series of algorithms which provide a secure key pair." UTAH CODE Ann. § 46-3-103(2)
 (1998). Utah Code section 46-3-401 provides:
 (1) Where a rule of law requires a signature, or provides for certain consequences in the
 absence of a signature, that rule is satisfied by a digital signature if: (a) that digital
 signature is verified by reference to the public key listed in a valid certificate issued by
 a licensed certification authority; (b) that digital signature was affixed by the signer with
 the intention of signing the message; and (c) the recipient has no knowledge or notice
 that the signer either: (i) breached a duty as a subscriber; or (ii) does not rightfully hold
 the private key used to affix the digital signature.
 Utah Code Ann. § 46-3-401 (1998).
 205. H.B. 3180, 90th Leg. (111. 1997), codified at 5 III. Comp. Stat. Ann. 175/1-105
 to 175/99-1 (West 1993 & 2000 Supp.). Section 5-105 provides: '"Electronic signature'
 means a signature in electronic form attached to or logically associated with an electronic
 record." Id. § 5-105. Section 10-105(a) provides:
 If, through the use of a qualified security procedure, it can be verified that an electronic
 record has not been altered since a specific point in time, then such electronic record
 shall be considered to be a secure electronic record from such specified point in time to
 the time of verification, if the relying party establishes that the qualified security pro-
 cedure was: (1) commercially reasonable under the circumstances; (2) applied by the
 relying party in a trustworthy manner; and (3) reasonably and in good faith relied upon
 by the relying party.
 Id. § 10-105(a).
 Section 10-1 10(b) provides:
 A qualified security procedure ... is a security procedure for identifying a person that
 is: (1) previously agreed to by the parties; or (2) certified by the Secretary of State . . .
 being capable of creating, in a trustworthy manner, an electronic signature that: (A) is
 unique to the signer within the context in which it is used; (B) can be used to objectively
 identify the person signing the electronic record; (C) was reliably created by such iden-
 tified person, (e.g., because some aspect of the procedure involves the use of a signature
 device or other means or method that is under the sole control of such person), and
 that cannot be readily duplicated or compromised; and (D) is created, and is linked to
 the electronic record to which it relates, in a manner such that if the record or the
 signature is intentionally or unintentionally changed after signing the electronic signa-
 ture is invalidated.
 Id. § 10-1 10(b).
 206. The drafters of UETA rejected the idea that any presumption should be associated
 with the use of an electronic signature, following instead the normal rule regarding burden
This content downloaded from 205.175.118.27 on Mon, 08 Jan 2018 18:36:13 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 336 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 56, November 2000
 extent that such statutes neither mandate nor prefer the use of "asym-
 metric cryptosystems," but instead set a standard for a highly secure and
 reliable form of electronic signature that at least in theory could be met
 by various technologies, they might not be preempted by E-SIGN. Artful
 drafting, however, may not be sufficient - if a law is phrased in terms of
 performance standards that in reality can only be met by a particular
 technology, it seems likely that it would not be considered technically neu-
 tral for purposes of the Act.
 FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATORY AGENCY
 INTERPRETIVE AND EXEMPTIVE AUTHORITY
 REGULATORY AUTHORITY TO INTERPRET E-SIGN
 E-SIGN provides that both federal and state regulatory agencies having
 rulemaking authority with respect to the statutes that they administer may
 use that authority to "interpret" section 101 of the Act with respect to
 those statutes.207 This interpretive authority allows regulatory agencies to
 provide compliance guidelines and otherwise flesh out the E-SIGN re-
 quirements in the context of the particular industries that they regulate
 and the statutes that they administer. As noted in the legislative history,
 "[gjiving each agency authority to apply section 101 to the laws it admin-
 isters will ensure that this bill will be read flexibly, in accordance with the
 needs of each separate statute to which it applies."208
 The permitted scope of agency interpretations, however, is constrained
 by the terms of the Act. Interpretations must be "consistent with" E-SIGN
 section 10 1209 and more specifically, may not "add to the requirements
 of" that section.210 Legal principles that are normally applicable to a reg-
 of proof of signatures which requires the relying party to prove who signed a record in fact.
 See UETA, supra note 5, § 9. For a discussion of why presumptions may not be appropriate
 in the electronic signature context, see Jane K. Winn, Couriers without Luggage: Negotiable In-
 struments and Digital Signatures, 49 S.C. L. Rev. 739 (1998), available at <http://www.smu.edu/
 ~jwinn/ecouriers.htm>.
 207. E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 104(b). Because it is limited to interpreting E-SIGN section
 101, the interpretive authority does not extend to, among other things: the provisions on
 state preemption, contained in E-SIGN; the exceptions to the Act, contained in E-SIGN
 section 103; the agency interpretive authority itself, as well as the exemptive authority and
 related provisions in E-SIGN section 104; and the definitions in E-SIGN section 106. Sim-
 ilarly, it does not apply to the special provisions in Title II of the Act, relating to transferable
 records.
 208. 146 Cong. Reg. H4359 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
 209. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 104(b)(2)(A).
 210. Id. § 104(b)(2)(B). The explicit proscription against adding to the requirements of
 section 1 0 1 is notable since, as discussed in connection with the ability of states to supersede
 E-SIGN, the mere requirement that interpretive regulations be "consistent" with the re-
 quirements of section 1 0 1 implies that regulatory agencies not add to those requirements.
 The inclusion of this explicit provision appears to be a matter of emphasis, evidencing a
 strong Congressional intent that E-SIGN's affirmative requirements, such as the consumer
 consent provisions contained in section 101(c), not become a mere floor that may be overlaid
 with regulatory requirements.
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 ulatory agency's interpretation of a statute would impose substantially
 these same constraints.211 Nevertheless, the fact that these constraints are
 expressly set forth in the Act reflects a legislative intent that they be strictly
 applied to ensure that the legislative purposes of E-SIGN, including the
 objective of uniformity, are accomplished.212 Moreover, the Act further
 constrains agency discretion in "interpreting" the Act by requiring that
 such interpretations must be based on findings by the agency that:
 • there is substantial justification for the interpretation;
 • the methods selected to carry out the regulatory purpose are sub-
 stantially equivalent to those imposed on paper or other non-elec-
 tronic records and will not impose unreasonable costs on the ac-
 ceptance and use of electronic records; and
 • subject to limited exceptions in the context of an agency's record
 keeping requirements and government procurement,213 the meth-
 ods selected to carry out the regulatory purpose are technologically
 neutral, in that they neither require nor accord greater legal status
 to specific technologies or technical performance specifications.214
 Regulatory agencies, such as the SEC, the banking agencies, and the 1RS,
 that have already issued or proposed interpretive guidance or regulations
 on the use of electronic records and signatures can be expected to utilize
 211. When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers,
 it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress
 has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear,
 that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
 the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the . . . the statute is
 silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
 whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
 (1984).
 212. The conference report is designed to prevent Federal and State regulators from
 undermining the broad purpose of this Act, to facilitate electronic commerce and
 electronic record keeping. To ensure that the purposes of this Act are upheld, Federal
 and State regulatory authority is strictly circumscribed. It is expected that Courts
 reviewing administrative actions will be rigorous in seeing that the purpose of this
 Act, to ensure the widest use and dissemination of electronic commerce and records
 are not undermined.
 146 Cong. Rec. H4355 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement of Rep. Bliley); see also 146
 Cong. Rec. S5286 (daily ed. June 16, 2000) (statement of Sen. Abraham). But see, 146 CONG.
 Rec. H4359 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement of Rep. Dingell) (no "unusual test in re-
 viewing an agency's regulations" would be appropriate because these constraints merely
 "restate the usual [legal] test that applies to and limits an agency's interpretation of a law it
 administers.").
 213. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, §§ 104(b)(3)(A) and 104(b)(4). The special exception allow-
 ing the agencies to establish technologically non-neutral performance standards for record
 keeping is discussed in the text accompanying supra notes 87-104.
 214. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 104(b)(2)(C)(iii).
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 this interpretive authority to clarify the extent to which their rules need to
 be modified in light of E-SIGN and, conversely, the extent to which
 E-SIGN requirements can be satisfied using methodologies already per-
 mitted under those guidelines.
 It may be tempting for these and other federal and state regulatory
 agencies to attempt to end-run the section 104 limitations with respect to
 E-SIGN's consumer consent requirements, which apply only when other
 law requires information to be provided to a consumer "in writing,"215 by
 "interpreting" those requirements as inapplicable to any record that their
 own regulations or guidelines allow to be provided electronically. Under
 such an interpretation, even when the statute administered by the agency
 calls for the required record to be "written," the agency rules would
 change the underlying law, leaving no "writing" requirement that could
 be affected by the E-SIGN rule.216 If that were true, agencies would be
 free, for example, to establish their own requirements for the consent re-
 quired in connection with the use of electronic records, irrespective of
 whether those requirements were more stringent or more lenient than the
 E-SIGN consent provisions.217
 Such a result, however, would be at odds with the uniformity that is one
 of the central purposes of E-SIGN and, more particularly, with the very
 explicit limitations on agency authority in section 104(b). There would be
 little reason for E-SIGN to have so explicitly and severely constrained
 agencies' "interpretive" authority if those provisions could be made moot
 by "substantive" regulations that do precisely what section 104(b) enjoins.
 Moreover, as discussed below, E-SIGN gives federal regulatory agencies a
 specific, but again very limited, power to exempt records that are subject
 to their authority from the application of the section 101 (c) consent re-
 quirements.218 To conclude that by adopting (or continuing) regulations
 allowing electronic records to be used in lieu of paper and ink, subject to
 215. Id. § 101(c)(l).
 216. A variation on this argument is that the E-SIGN consent requirements are merely a
 "safe-harbor," stating one set of conditions that, if met, will satisfy requirements to provide
 required information in writing, without precluding other rules of law that specify other
 conditions that can be met to satisfy those requirements. The safe-harbor argument can be
 applied equally to both statutes and regulatory regimes. It, however, suffers from substantially
 the same difficulties that affect the regulatory interpretation argument discussed in the text,
 and in the case of state law provisions, it applies as well as from the limits placed on state
 preemption under E-SIGN section 102(a). Alternative, and presumably less demanding, legal
 requirements regarding either the need for or the nature of a consumer consent arguably are
 just as "inconsistent" with the E-SIGN consent requirements as are (presumably more strin-
 gent) requirements that would be imposed in lieu of the E-SIGN requirements.
 217. Note that, under this line of reasoning, timing would seem not to matter. Thus, a
 regulation that is neither proposed nor adopted until well after the effective date of E-SIGN
 would be just as effective to cut-off the applicability of the E-SIGN consent provisions as
 would rules and guidelines that were in full force prior to its adoption.
 218. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 104(d)(l). See infra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
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 compliance with the particular terms or conditions imposed by the agency,
 will make the section 101(c) requirements inapplicable to those records is
 to effectively read the section 104 limitations on agency exemptive au-
 thority out of the statute.
 Other, more nuanced distinctions, however, may allow some agency
 requirements regarding consumer consent to the provision of electronic
 records to differ from, but still co-exist with, the E-SIGN requirements.
 For example, the SEC's interpretive guidelines on electronic delivery do
 not focus on whether or when an electronic record will satisfy a "writing"
 requirement, but rather on electronic delivery as a substitute for the deliv-
 ery of paper. The guidelines begin with the premise that the securities laws
 are media neutral,219 and they proceed to define the conditions under
 which requirements to deliver written materials may be satisfied by elec-
 tronic means.220 Since E-SIGN section 101(c)(l) specifies that compliance
 with its requirements "satisfies the requirement that such information be
 in writing,"221 the door arguably is open for agencies to apply their own,
 additional requirements for effecting electronic delivery.222 The distinction
 between the two types of requirements, however, is tenuous at best, and it
 would need to be applied cautiously to avoid subverting the purposes of
 the Act and, potentially, having the agency rules over-turned by the courts.
 219. "The federal securities statutes do not prescribe the medium to be used for providing
 information . . . ." Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, 60 SEC Docket 1091,
 1094 (October 6, 1995); see also Use of Electronic Media by Broker-Dealers, Transfer Agents,
 and Investment Advisers for Delivery of Information, 61 SEC Docket 2167 (May 9, 1996).
 "Because . . . none of the federal securities statutes exclusively require paper delivery of
 information, the Commission believes that interpretive guidance on the use of electronic
 media is appropriate." Id. 60 SEC Docket at 1093.
 220. "The Commission believes that delivery of information through an electronic me-
 dium generally could satisfy delivery or transmission obligations under the federal securities
 laws." Id., 60 SEC Docket at 1094. "The Commission would view information distributed
 through electronic means as satisfying the delivery or transmission requirements of the federal
 securities laws if such distribution results in the delivery to the intended recipients of sub-
 stantially equivalent information as these recipients would have had if the information were
 delivered to them in paper form." Id. "[BJroker-dealers, transfer agents, and investment
 advisers may satisfy their delivery obligations by using electronic media as an alternative to
 paper based media." Use of Electronic Media by Broker-Dealers, Transfer Agents, and In-
 vestment Advisers for Delivery of Information, 61 SEC Docket 2167, 2170 (May 9, 1996).
 See also, Use of Electronic Media, 72 SEC Docket 753 (April 28, 2000).
 221. E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 101(c)(l).
 222. The SEC impliedly drew this distinction when it noted, in its release adopting Se-
 curities Act Rule 160, that even though the electronic provision of mutual prospectuses
 accompanying supplemental sales literature would be exempt from the E-SIGN consent
 requirements, it would "not consider supplemental sales literature that is electronically de-
 livered to have been preceded or accompanied by an electronic statutory prospectus unless"
 existing SEC electronic delivery requirements regarding "reasonably comparable access" to
 both the sales literature and the prospectus were satisfied. Exemption from Section 101 (c)( 1 )
 of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce for Registered Investment
 Companies, Securities Act Release No. 7877, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
 1)86,316 (July 24, 2000).
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 FEDERAL AGENCY EXEMPTIVE AUTHORITY
 E-SIGN also allows federal (but not state)223 regulatory agencies to "ex-
 empt without condition" any specified category or type of record from the
 Act's consumer consent requirements.224 In order to grant such an ex-
 emption, the agency must determine that the exemption is "necessary to
 eliminate a substantial burden on electronic commerce" and that it will
 not increase the risk of harm to consumers.225
 The requirement that any such exemption be "without condition" is
 consistent with the preemptive nature of the E-SIGN consent require-
 ments, which establish a single set of federal requirements for the use of
 electronic records to satisfy requirements that information be provided
 or made available in writing. Thus, while agencies may "interpret" the
 E-SIGN consent requirements, they may not condition an exemption from
 those consent provisions on compliance with their own, differing set of
 requirements. Given this limitation, however, agencies may be reluctant
 to use the exemptive authority.
 CONCLUSION
 E-SIGN should achieve its central objective, which is to provide busi-
 nesses with greater certainty surrounding the validity of electronic con-
 tracts. Part of the political price paid for that outcome was the inclusion
 of cumbersome consumer protection provisions of uncertain benefit to
 consumers. Although federal agencies have the authority to repeal any of
 these provisions that can later be shown to confer little benefit on consum-
 ers, anyone wishing to do business electronically with consumers will be
 forced in the short term to absorb the costs of developing and deploying
 systems that conform to those requirements. In addition, the complex and
 ambiguous preemption rules in E-SIGN are likely to remain a source of
 confusion for some time for the state and federal agencies that are subject
 to them.
 223. This distinction was not an oversight. "[T]he conferees considered and specifically
 rejected language that would have authorized State agencies to exempt records from the
 consent requirements." 146 CONG. Rec. S5222 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement of Sen.
 Leahy).
 224. See E-SIGN, supra note 1, § 104(d)(l).
 225. See id. Congressional opinions differed on the subject of how limiting the required
 finding that an exemption is "necessary" for this purpose would be. House Commerce Com-
 mittee Chairman Bliley suggested that "it is intended that [this] test ... not be read as too
 limiting. There are vast numbers of instances when section 1 0 1 (c) may not be appropriate
 or necessary and should be exempted by the appropriate regulator." 146 CONG. Rec. H4355
 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement of Rep. Bliley). Senator Leahy, however, took direct issue
 with this statement, stating that "the opposite is true. The test is, and was intended to be,
 demanding. The exemption must be 'necessary,' and not merely 'appropriate,' as Chairman
 Bliley suggested." 146 Cong. Rec. S5222 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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